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 SUMMARY TABLE 
 2008 2009 2010 2011
     
OUTPUT
 
(Real Annual Growth %)   
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.5 -7.0 - ½ 1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 2.2 -4.4 -3 -3 
Investment -13.7 -31.0 -25 ½ -3 ¼ 
Exports -0.8 -4.1 7 ½ 5 ½ 
Imports -2.9 -9.7 3 ½ 3 ¾ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -3.4 -7.6 - ¼ 2 ¼ 
Gross National Product (GNP) -3.5 -10.7 -1 ½ 2 
GNP per capita (constant prices) -5.3 -11.4 -1 ¾ 2 ¼ 
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)     
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 3.3 -1.7 -1 ½ ½ 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 4.1 -4.5 - ¾ 1 ¾ 
Wage Growth 2.9 -0.8 -3 -1 
 
LABOUR MARKET     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 2,100 1,928.5 1,860.1 1,849.9 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 141 258.6 286.1 289.0 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 6.3 11.8 13 ¼ 13 ½ 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE     
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -12.7 -24.6 -18.1 -21.1 
General Government Balance (€bn) -13.2 -23.4 -48.9 -16.1 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -7.3 -14.6 -31 -10 
Excluding Bank Payments  -12.1 -11 ½  
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 44.4 65.6 97 ¼ 105 
 
EXTERNAL TRADE     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -10 -4.9 -0.1 1.6 
Current Account (% of GNP) -6.6 -3.7 0 1 ¼ 
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (averages)     
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.47 1.39 1.31 1.28 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.79 0.89 0.85 0.83 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.50 1.00 1.00 1.25 
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SUMMARY 
The two most significant announcements on economic matters since the last Commentary 
were the release of the Quarterly National Accounts for Q2 2010 on 23 September 2010 and 
the government’s statement on banking on 30 September. In the case of the former, the 
news was, at best, disappointing while in the case of the latter, it was horrendous. Both have 
impacted upon our view of the timing of potential recovery in the economy and on 
appropriate policy. 
 
We now expect that GNP will contract by 1½ per cent this year, down from - ½ per cent in 
our Summer Commentary. For GDP, we now expect there to be a decline of ¼ per cent this 
year. This represents a change on our summer forecast when we expected GDP to grow by 
¼ per cent. For 2011, we expect GNP to grow by 2 per cent and for GDP to grow by 2¼ 
per cent. Again, these are marginally down relative to our last Commentary. 
 
We now expect that employment will average 1.86 million this year, down 68,000 from 
2009, a fall of 3½ per cent. We expect the rate of unemployment to average 13¼ per cent. 
For 2011, we expect the number employed to average 1.85 million and the rate of 
unemployment to average 13½ per cent.  
 
In the year ending April 2010, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) recorded net outward 
migration to have been 34,500. This was well below our forecast of 70,000. However, we 
discuss how this figure of 34,500 seems to be a conservative estimate of the rate of outflow 
when compared with estimates of migration contained in another CSO publication, namely, 
the Quarterly National Household Survey. We expect the net outflow in the year ending April 
2011 to be 60,000. This is an increase of 10,000 on our earlier forecast. 
 
The General Government Deficit is expected to be 31 per cent of GDP this year, a truly 
dramatic figure. Of course, almost two-thirds of this is a one-off extraordinary item related 
to the banking bailout. For 2011, we expect the deficit to be 10 per cent of GDP, based on 
a budgetary package of €4 billion in savings. 
 
On inflation, we expect HICP inflation to average -1½ per cent this year and + ½ per cent 
in 2011. For the CPI, the corresponding forecasts are -¾ per cent in 2010 and + 1¾ per 
cent in 2011. We expect wage growth to be negative in both 2010 and in 2011, at rates of -3 
per cent and -1 per cent respectively. 
 
In our General Assessment, we look at the budgetary challenges facing the country and in 
particular at the prospects of bringing the deficit down to sustainable levels in a reasonable 
time frame. Using the low growth profile as published by the ESRI in July 2010, we assess 
what level of savings will be required to achieve a deficit of 3 per cent by 2014. Our 
calculations suggest that savings of up to €15 billion could be needed, i.e., twice the sum 
that was under discussion at the time Ireland and the Commission agreed to the 2014 
deadline. We express a concern over the potential negative impact on the economy of this 
scale of adjustment over this period of time, while accepting that the 2014 deadline is 
unlikely to be changed. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 94.8 84.3 -10.5 -6.7 -11.1 -4.3 -7.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.2 27.7 -1.5 -1.3 -5.1 -0.7 -4.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 39.8 24.7 -15.1 -12.3 -37.9 -10.0 -31.0 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 150.2 144.8 -5.4 -6.2 -3.6 0.6 -4.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.3 -2.3 -2.6 -2.5    
        
Final Demand 314.3 279.3 -35.0 -29.0 -11.1 -2.1 -9.2 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 133.9 120.4 -13.5 -13.0 -10.1 -0.4 -9.7 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy 0.4 -0.7 -1.2 -2.4    
        
GDP at Market Prices 180.0 159.6 -20.3 -13.6 -11.3 -4.0 -7.6 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 -2.9 12.2 0.8 11.3 
        
GNP at Market Prices 154.7 131.2 -23.4 -16.5 -15.1 -5.0 -10.7 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.9 2.2 -0.7 -24.4 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 79.4 72.7 -6.7 -8.5 
  Other: 60.5 53.9 -6.5 -10.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 1.0   
 Statistical Discrepancy 0.4 -0.7   
     
Net Domestic Product 143.0 129.1 -13.9 -9.7 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 12.2 
     
National Income 117.7 100.7 -17.0 -14.5 
Depreciation 16.9 14.8 -2.2 -12.8 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 134.6 115.4 -19.2 -14.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.0 15.8 -4.2 -21.2 
     
GNP at Market Prices 154.7 131.2 -23.4 -15.1 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 16 24 8 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 
Net Transfers -1.2 -0.9 0.3 
    
Balance on Current Account -10.2 -4.9 5.3 
as % of GNP -6.6 -3.7 2.8 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2008 2009 2009 Volume 
Change 
 Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  1.4   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 154.7 139.5 -15.2 -9.8 
GNDI* 153.5 138.6 -14.9 -9.7 
National Resources** 153.6 137.4 -16.2 -10.6 
*GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
  
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 84.3 82.2 -2.1 -0.4 -2 ½ -2 - ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.7 25.7 -2.0 -0.8 -7 ¼ -4 ¼ -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 24.7 17.6 -7.1 -6.3 -28 ¾ -4 ¼ -25 ½ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 144.8 155.7 10.9 10.9 7 ½ 0 7 ½ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -2.3 -0.1 2.2 1.7    
        
Final Demand 279.3 281.1 1.9 4.1 ¾ - ¾ 1 ½ 
less: 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.4 124.1 3.7 4.4 3 - ½ 3 ½ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 -0.1    
        
GDP at Market Prices 159.6 157.8 -1.8 -0.2 -1 ¼ -1 - ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.7 -2.3 -1.7 8 ¼ 2 6 
        
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 127.1 -4.2 -1.9 -3 ¼ -1 ¾ -1 ½ 
   
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.4 0.2 10 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72.7 68.3 -4.4 -6 
  Other: 53.9 57.5 3.5 6 ½ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 -0.2   
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7   
     
Net Domestic Product 129.1 127.2 -1.9 -1 ½ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -28.4 -30.7 -2.3 8 ¼ 
     
National Income 100.7 96.4 -4.2 -4 ¼ 
Depreciation 14.8 14.7 -0.1 - ½ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 115.4 111.2 -4.3 -3 ¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 15.9 0.1 ¾ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 127.1 -4.2 -3 ¼ 
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn   €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 24.4 31.6 7.2 
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.7 -2.3 
Net Transfers -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account -4.9 -0.1 4.8 
as % of GNP -3.7 -0.1 3.7 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2009 2010 2010 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  0.8   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 131.2 130.2 -1.0 - ¾ 
GNDI* 130.3 129.3 -1.0 - ¾ 
National Resources** 130.4 128.1 -2.3 -1 ¾ 
*GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Forecast Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.2 83.9 1.7 0.8 2 1 1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.7 24.7 -1.0 -0.8 -4 -1 -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.6 17.0 -0.6 -0.6 -3 ¾ - ¼ -3 ¼ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 155.7 164.7 9.1 8.5 5 ¾ ¼ 5 ½ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1    
        
Final Demand 281.1 290.3 9.2 8.2 3 ¼ ¼ 3 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 124.1 129.6 5.6 4.7 4 ½ ¾ 3 ¾ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 157.8 161.4 3.6 3.6 2 ¼ 0 2 ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.7 -32.6 -1.8 -1.2 6 2 4 
        
GNP at Market Prices 127.1 128.8 1.8 2.4 1 ½ - ½ 2 
    
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.4 2.5 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 68.3 67.1 -1.2 -1 ¾ 
  Other: 57.5 60.7 3.3 5 ¾ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0 
       Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0 
     
Net Domestic Product 127.2 129.4 2.2 1 ¾ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -30.7 -32.6 -1.8 6 
     
National Income 96.4 96.8 0.4 ½ 
Depreciation 14.7 15.0 0.3 2 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 111.2 111.8 0.6 ½ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.9 17.0 1.1 7 
     
GNP at Market Prices 127.1 128.8 1.8 1 ½ 
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 31.6 35.1 3.5 
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.7 -32.6 -1.8 
Net Transfers -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
Balance on Current Account -0.1 1.6 1.7 
as % of GNP -0.1 1.2 1.3 
  
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
 
 2010 2011 2011 Volume Change 
  Estimate  
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -0.6   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 127.1 128.9 1.8 1 ½ 
GNDI* 126.2 128.0 1.8 1 ½ 
National Resources** 126.3 128.1 1.8 1 ½ 
*GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers.
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THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The recovery in the world economy strengthened during the second half 
of 2010 although the outlook remains clouded by a high degree of 
uncertainty and the uneven nature of the recovery to date. The world 
economy expanded at an annual rate of 5.3 per cent in the first six months 
of 2010 according to the latest International Monetary Fund World Economic 
Outlook.1 This overall performance masks considerable variation in the 
extent of the economic recovery across different regions. Global growth 
continues to be powered by the strong recovery in emerging and 
developing economies, while the recovery in the advanced economies is 
progressing at a more modest pace in the face of ongoing financial market 
fragility. In this setting, the world economy is expected to grow by 4.8 per 
cent in 2010 and by 4.2 per cent in 2011. Growth in the emerging and 
developed economies is expected to average 6.4 per cent in 2011 while 
growth in advanced economies is expected to reach 2.2 per cent. This 
divergent performance reflects the broad-based economic recovery 
underway in many emerging market economies where the recovery has 
moved beyond restocking and on to consumption and fixed investment. 
This has added momentum to the expansion in output created by buoyant 
export growth. In contrast, the recovery process in place in many advanced 
economies remains unbalanced as a result of subdued household spending, 
high unemployment, large budget deficits and ongoing problems in the 
banking system.   
 
Growth in the US economy moderated sharply during the second 
quarter of 2010 as the impact of the unprecedented macroeconomic policy 
stimulus began to wane2 (Figure 1). The economy grew at an annualised 
rate of 1.7 per cent in the three months to June, down from 3.7 per cent in 
the first quarter. The moderation in the growth rate in the second quarter 
was due to a slowdown in inventory accumulation and sluggish personal 
consumption – the largest component of US GDP. In contrast, fixed 
investment rebounded strongly during the second quarter driven by growth 
in computers and equipment. Looking ahead, it is expected that personal 
consumption will remain sluggish in the coming quarters as a result of the 
deterioration in household net worth arising from falling house prices, high 
                                                          
1 The international numbers used in this Commentary are taken from the October 2010 IMF 
World Economic Outlook.   
2 In this section, growth rates which refer to the performance in a particular quarter are 
seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-06102010-
AP/EN/2-06102010-AP-EN.PDF 
Main 
Developments 
6 
unemployment and a weak labour market. Mirroring the situation in 
Ireland, these concerns have been manifested in an unusually high savings 
rate; the personal savings rate since early 2009 has averaged 6 per cent, the 
highest level since 1995. With the impetus to economic recovery provided 
by fiscal policy and the inventory cycle beginning to subside and consumer 
spending remaining flat, international forecasters expect the recovery in the 
US to occur at a slower pace than at the time of the last Commentary.   US 
GDP is now expected to increase by 2.6 per cent in 2010 and 2.3 per cent 
in 2011.   
 
The recovery in the UK economy gathered momentum in the second 
quarter of 2010, with GDP increasing by 1.2 per cent compared with a 0.3 
per cent increase in the first quarter (Figure 1). The rise in GDP between 
April and June represented the fastest pace of growth since the first quarter 
of 2001 and was fuelled by particularly strong growth in construction 
output. Both National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
(July 2010 Economic Review) and the Bank of England, in their most recent 
Inflation Report, have drawn attention to the UK’s disappointing trade 
performance. Despite the substantial depreciation in sterling, net trade is 
estimated to have made a negative contribution to growth in each of the 
past three quarters as the economy slowly adjusts to the production of 
tradable goods and services. Nevertheless, NIESR expect the 
competitiveness gains from the depreciation of sterling to eventually 
provide the platform for strong growth in exports. UK growth will be 
tempered in 2010 and 2011 as a result of the ongoing fiscal consolidation 
and continued weakness in the supply of credit to the private sector. 
NIESR estimate that the measures introduced in the emergency budget in 
June will reduce the growth rate by 0.4 per cent in 2011. The further 
adjustments expected in the forthcoming budget are also likely to act as a 
drag on growth next year. Overall, the IMF anticipates that the UK 
economy will expand by 1.7 per cent in 2010 and 2 per cent in 2011.  
Figure 1: Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Volume Growth (%), Seasonally  
       Adjusted 
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2
%
Euro Area United Kingdom United States
Source: Eurostat.  
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Despite a sharp acceleration in the pace of growth during the second 
quarter, there are few signs that the Euro Area economy has yet entered a 
broad-based and self-sustaining recovery phase. While Euro Area GDP 
increased by 1 per cent in the second quarter, there were pronounced 
differences in economic performance recorded across the region. The 
expansion in the three months to June 2010 was driven largely by vigorous 
growth in the German economy, strong export growth and a temporary 
boost to construction output related to the adverse weather conditions in 
the early part of 2010. Growth in the Euro Area’s other large economies 
such as France and Italy remains modest as a result of weak private 
consumption, high unemployment and the withdrawal of stimulus 
measures introduced in the wake of the financial crisis. Growth in other 
economies including Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain is being held back 
as a result of the implementation of fiscal austerity measures as well as 
competitiveness imbalances. The robust performance of Germany’s 
manufacturing exports is expected to be moderated by this weak demand 
among its trading partners. Against this backdrop, the recovery in the Euro 
Area is projected to continue at a modest pace. The IMF expects GDP to 
expand by 1.7 per cent in 2010 and 1.5 per cent in 2011.  
 
While the global economic recovery continued during the first half of 
2010 at a more impressive pace than had earlier been anticipated by many 
forecasters, in an environment of elevated risk, potential obstacles exist 
which could derail the nascent economic recovery currently underway.  In 
the Euro Area, the unwinding of exceptional fiscal stimulus packages, 
concern over public debt sustainability and a fragile financial sector are all 
adversely affecting economic performance. The turmoil in sovereign debt 
markets during the second quarter of 2010, arising from the Greek crisis, 
has already caused severe disruption to the normal functioning of 
European financial markets. The stress tests conducted by the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors brought about some improvement in 
market conditions in recent months. However, European banks remain 
heavily dependent on the European Central Bank financing facilities and 
have significant exposure to sovereign debt which increases the 
vulnerability of the European financial sector to future shocks.  
 
Contagion from the financial instability during the second quarter of 
2010 added to existing concerns regarding public debt sustainability. For 
many European economies, the task of restoring order to the public 
finances remains a prerequisite for a return to healthy growth. Chastened 
by the lessons from the Greek crisis, many European governments are in 
the process of implementing fiscal consolidation plans.  However, as 
shown in Figure 2, government bond yields remain elevated in some of the 
Euro Area’s peripheral economies reflecting ongoing market concerns 
regarding debt sustainability. The precarious position of some European 
countries in sovereign debt markets could act as a drag on economic 
recovery if, as noted in the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report, public debt 
issuance crowds out private sector credit growth leading to an increase in 
the cost of borrowing for the private sector. This highlights the necessity 
for high risk countries to produce and implement credible fiscal 
consolidation plans or face a further loss of investor confidence and a 
further increase in interest rates. At the same time, the implementation of 
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deep budgetary cuts over the coming years will weigh on growth in the 
Euro Area and inhibit the recovery in private demand necessary to create 
and sustain growth.  
Figure 2: Ten Year Government Bond Spreads Relative to Germany  
        (July 2008 – 11 October 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The current state of the US economy represents another downside risk 
to the recovery in the international economy. Slower than expected 
consumer spending as well as continued weakness in residential and non-
residential construction has stifled the recovery in US output and 
employment. In response to these concerns, the Federal Reserve has 
announced its intention to hold US interest rates at their current 
exceptionally low levels, using a variety of tools, while standing ready to 
deploy other exceptional monetary policy options to provide additional 
stimulus if needed. In previous Commentaries we have noted the argument 
put forward by commentators such as Olivier Blanchard, Chief Economist 
at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that premature fiscal tightening, 
by countries where debt sustainability is not in question, could jeopardise 
the economic recovery. In a recent speech, Adam Posen3 has argued that 
premature withdrawal of accommodative monetary policies also poses a 
serious threat to achieving a sustained economic recovery.  Posen believes 
that further unconventional monetary stimulus is needed to avoid 
persistent high unemployment and low growth in the years ahead. While 
monetary policy is likely to remain highly accommodative over the short 
term, designing appropriate exit strategies from the exceptional policy 
measures introduced during the crisis will be one of the key priorities for 
governments and policymakers over the coming year. The challenge of 
determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy, so as to avoid 
undermining the fragile recovery currently underway, while at the same 
                                                          
3 Adam Posen is an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee.  
Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech449.pdf  
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time guarding against inflationary pressures is discussed in a recent paper 
by David Miles.4    
 
 
EXPORTS 
As discussed in previous Commentaries and in Bergin et al. (2010)5, we see 
the recovery in the Irish economy being driven by an expansion in Irish 
exports of goods and services. The recent performance of exports provides 
reassurance that the recovery in the Irish economy can be export-led. Irish 
exports have proven to be relatively resilient during the recession and the 
magnitude of the decline was much less severe than that experienced by 
other advanced economies (Figure 3). During the second quarter of 2010, 
exports of goods and services increased by 7.4 per cent compared to the 
first quarter.  
 
Ireland’s future export performance will be determined by the extent to 
which the economy can regain competitiveness through reductions in wage 
rates and other costs as well as the level of world demand. For 2010, we 
expect price inflation here to be lower than in the UK and in the Euro Area 
with positive implications for competitiveness. For 2011, we again expect 
HICP inflation in Ireland to be lower than that expected for the Euro Area 
and the UK. Regarding wage rates, NIESR estimate that average earnings 
in the Euro Area increased by 1.7 per cent in 2009 with further increases of 
1.8 per cent and 2.6 per cent anticipated in 2010 and 2011. As discussed 
below in the Incomes section, we estimate that an economy-wide wage 
reduction of 1 per cent occurred last year with further reductions in wage 
rates of 3 per cent expected in 2010 and 2011.  
Figure 3: Volume Exports of Goods and Services, Quarter-on-Quarter 
  Percentage Change, Seasonally Adjusted 
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4 Miles, D., 2010. “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability” in Budget Perspectives 2010, 
ESRI. http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/RS18/RS18.pdf 
5 Bergin, A., Conefrey, T., Fitz Gerald, J., and Kearney, I. 2010. Recovery Scenarios for Ireland: 
An Update. Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.  
Implications 
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A new experimental release by the CSO, the Services Producer Price Index,6 
sheds some further light on the extent of the competitiveness adjustment 
currently underway in the Irish economy. The most recent release indicates 
that services prices fell by 3.6 per cent in the second quarter of 2010 
compared to Q2 2009. The largest declines were recorded in architecture, 
engineering and technical testing (-8 per cent), computer programming and 
consultancy (-6 per cent) and warehousing and storage (-6 per cent). Taken 
together, these developments in prices, wages and other costs (including 
the sharp fall in the cost of housing) imply that the Irish economy should 
regain some of the competitiveness lost in the years preceding the current 
crisis.   
 
As noted, the outlook for Irish exports over the forecast horizon 
depends crucially on the international recovery. World trade has rebounded 
strongly following the collapse which occurred towards the end of 2008 
and has now exceeded pre-crisis levels (Figure 4). World trade is expected 
to grow by 16.5 per cent in 2010 but is likely to moderate sharply in 2011 
unless a strong pick-up in consumer spending takes hold. Despite this, the 
international environment for Irish exports should be favourable in 2011 if 
the growth rates currently forecast by the IMF for the UK, US and Euro 
Area materialise.  
Figure 4: Index of World Trade 
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EXCHANGE RATES 
Related to the issue of competitiveness and the outlook for Irish exports 
are the expected developments in bilateral exchange rates. As with the 
other international numbers used in this Commentary, the exchange rates are 
taken from the most recent IMF World Economic Outlook.  The IMF assumes 
that exchange rates will remain constant at their average levels during the 
period August 4 – September 10, 2010. These assumptions imply that the 
                                                          
6 The experimental Services Producer Price Index (SPPI) measures changes in the average 
prices charged by domestic service producers to other businesses for a selected range of 
services. The indices are still under development and may be subject to revisions following 
methodological improvement. 
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sterling/euro exchange rate will average 0.85 in 2010 and 0.83 in 2011, 
while the USD/EUR exchange rate will average 1.31 in 2010 and 1.28 in 
2011.  
 
 
The crisis in Greece as well as wider concerns regarding public debt 
sustainability in a number of other peripheral Euro Area countries gave rise 
to a substantial fall in the value of the Euro against both the UK pound 
and the dollar during the second quarter of 2010 (Figure 5). The euro fell 
to a four year low of $1.19 against the dollar and an eighteen month low of 
£0.82 against the pound in June this year. The agreement between the EU 
and the IMF to create the European Financial Stability Facility as well as 
the strong rise in Euro Area GDP in the second quarter has seen the Euro 
recently reclaim some of the ground lost in the early part of 2010, although 
its value remains well below the heights reached against both the dollar and 
the pound in 2007-2008 period. Were this position to be maintained in 
2011, and if the assumptions on exchange rates for 2011 prove to be 
correct, it should benefit the Irish economy by providing a boost to exports 
outside the Euro Area.   
Figure 5: Exchange Rates 
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INTEREST RATES 
The ECB main refinancing rate was reduced rapidly from 3.75 per cent in 
October 2008 to an all time low of 1 per cent in May 2009 (Figure 6). The 
Euro Area emerged from recession during the second half of 2009, 
although the pace of growth has so far been moderate and unbalanced as 
discussed above. The return to growth in the Euro Area is not expected to 
put significant upward pressure on inflation over the forecast horizon as 
private demand and hence domestic price pressures remain subdued. The 
ECB has consistently stated that the current interest rates and the 
accommodative monetary policy stance are appropriate. With inflation rates 
expected to remain moderate in 2011, it appears unlikely that the ECB will 
consider raising interest rates until the second half of 2011. As a result, our 
forecasts are based on the assumption that the main refinancing rate will be 
held at 1 per cent for the remainder of 2010, rising to 1.25 per cent by the 
end of 2011.  
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Table 1: Short term International Outlook 
   
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Prices* 
Inflation 
Unemployment Rate General Government 
Balance 
 % % % % of GDP 
   
Country 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
             
UK -4.9 1.7 2.0 2.1 3.1 2.5 7.5 7.9 7.4 -10.3 -10.2 -8.1 
Germany -4.7 3.3 2.0 0.2 1.3 1.4 7.5 7.1 7.1 -3.1 -4.5 -3.7 
France -2.5 1.6 1.6 0.1 1.6 1.6 9.4 9.8 9.8 -7.6 -8.0 -6.0 
Italy -5.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.7 7.8 8.7 8.6 -5.2 -5.1 -4.3 
             
Euro Area -4.1 1.7 1.5 0.3 1.6 1.5 9.4 10.1 10.0 -3.1 -4.5 -3.7 
USA -2.6 2.6 2.3 -0.3 1.4 1.0 9.3 9.7 9.6 -12.9 -11.1 -9.7 
Japan -5.2 2.8 1.5 -1.4 -1.0 -0.3 5.1 5.1 5.0 -10.2 -9.6 -8.9 
China 9.1 8.5 9.0 5.9 -0.1 0.6 9.8 7.8 8.6    
             
OECD -3.2 2.7 2.2 0.1 1.4 1.3 8.0 8.3 8.2 -10.1 -9.3 -8.0 
             
Ireland -7.6 - ¼ 2 ¼ -1.7 -1 ½  ½ 11.8 13 ¼ 13 ½ -14.6 -31     -10    
             
Source: Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010. 
*HICP for EU countries, consumption deflator for rest of world. 
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The persistence of low interest rates and the accommodative stance of 
monetary policy more broadly are welcome developments for Ireland given 
the ongoing weaknesses in the economy and the fragile state of the banking 
sector. High ECB interest rates in addition to the current high risk 
premium attached to Irish government debt, would clearly pose a 
significant challenge to economic recovery. Low ECB interest rates should 
provide a supportive environment for households and businesses that are 
currently in the process of repairing their balance sheets, notwithstanding 
the increases in interest rates which have taken place independent of 
changes in the ECB rate shown in Figure 6. Moreover, the provision of 
liquidity by the ECB to the banking system, through the implementation of 
non-standard monetary policy measures such as Longer-Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTROs), has been crucial in easing financial market tensions. 
As discussed further in the Monetary Sector Developments section, Irish banks 
have had particularly intensive recourse to the facilities provided as part of 
the ECB’s monetary policy operations. This support will remain important 
in the light of the challenging conditions still facing Irish banks in 
international financial markets.    
Figure 6: Interest Rates 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
In this Quarterly Economic Commentary our growth forecasts for 2011 are 
revised downwards relative to the Summer Commentary. We now forecast 
GDP to grow by 2¼ per cent, a downward revision of ½ a percentage 
point. There are two main reasons for this revision. The first is related to 
poor consumer confidence. Given the turmoil surrounding the Irish 
sovereign debt market in recent months, the latest estimates of the cost of 
the bank bailout, and the likelihood of a larger than anticipated fiscal 
correction in the December budget,  it is not surprising that consumer 
confidence has remained sluggish. Nevertheless, without a resumption of 
strong consumption growth, it will be difficult to achieve a broad-based 
recovery in the economy. The second reason why we expect growth to be 
lower in 2011 is related to the budget. We assume in this Commentary that 
the budgetary cuts for 2011 will be at least €1 billion higher than in the 
Summer Commentary, thereby leading to lower consumption spending and 
lower disposable incomes.  
 
Table 2 shows the implied carryover figures from the most recent QNA 
data. Carryover is the annual change in a variable if it were to remain at its 
level in the last known quarter. This essentially measures the impact of past 
changes; it is not a forecast. Were economic activity to remain unchanged 
from the level recorded in the second quarter of 2010 then GDP would 
contract by 1 per cent in 2010. However, we expect some pick-up in 
economic activity through the second half of 2010, in particular in 
consumption, so that our forecast suggests GDP will fall by just ¼ per cent 
in 2010. In 2011, we anticipate that a further tight budget will keep 
consumption growth modest at 1 per cent, and also further depress 
investment.  
 
Despite poor prospects in relation to domestic consumption over the 
short term, the latest data suggest that the Irish traded sector has grown 
very strongly in the first half of 2010. While we expect this very strong 
bounce-back effect to moderate in the second half of the year, we have 
nevertheless revised upwards our forecast for growth in the industrial 
sector and our estimates of exports growth. The most recent data indicate 
clearly that the export sector is out of recession and likely to grow strongly 
in 2010 and 2011. These forecasts are based on the expectation among 
international forecasters that growth in the world economy will recover 
during 2010, picking up further in 2011.  
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Table 2: Implied Carryover from Quarterly National Accounts Q2,  
     Constant Price Growth Rates 
QNA Q2 
Carryover 
QEC 
Forecast 
2009 2010 2010 2011 
Private Consumption -7.0 -1.1 - ½ 1   
Government Consumption -4.4 -2.8 -3   -3   
Investment -31.0 -17.6 -25 ½ -3 ¼ 
Exports -4.1 7.6 7 ½ 5 ½ 
Imports -9.7 5.7 3 ½ 3 ¾ 
GDP at market prices -7.6 -0.8 - ¼ 2 ¼ 
GNP at market prices -10.7 -3.4 -1 ½ 2   
Sectoral Output 
GDP at factor cost -5.0 0.0    -¼   2¼ 
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing -3.6 1.6 5 2 
Distribution Transport and 
Communications -9.3 0.0 0 2 
Public Administration and Defence -0.5 -3.0 -3 -2 
Other Services (including Rent) -2.3 -1.6 -¼  2 
Industry – Building and Construction -31.4 -26.6 -31½  -8 
Other Industry -0.1 10.7 7 5 
 
The most recent announcements by the Minister for Finance signalled 
that the government will be injecting €30.7 billion into Anglo Irish Bank 
and Irish Nationwide Building Society in 2010. This will result in a General 
Government Deficit as a percentage of GDP of 31 per cent. Excluding the 
once-off costs of the banks, the figure would be 11½, as forecast in the 
Winter 2009 Commentary. We have assumed a stylised budget of €4 billion in 
cuts, we estimate this could reduce the deficit to 10 per cent in 2011.  In 
relation to the labour market, our forecast of unemployment for 2011 is 
slightly higher than in the previous Commentary at 13½ per cent, reflecting 
the impact of higher budgetary cuts and somewhat higher employment 
losses in the banking sector in 2011.  
 
 The latest Quarterly National Accounts (QNA Q2 2010) reveal that 
consumption has continued to fall in 2010, albeit at a much reduced pace 
compared to last year. Consumption fell by -1.7 per cent in Q2 2010 
compared to Q2 2009, whereas the fall between Q2 2009 and Q2 2008 was 
-6.5 per cent. In Figure 7, the seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter 
changes in consumption over the past two years are presented. The pace of 
decline has moderated significantly compared to the dramatic slump in 
consumption witnessed in Q1 2009. However, the continuing negative 
trend means that consumption, seasonally adjusted, was 8 per cent lower in 
Q2 2010 than it was in Q4 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumption 
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Figure 7: Quarter-on-Quarter Percentage Change in Volume of  
       Consumption, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts, CSO.  
 
Table 3 shows a range of measures that track the recent trends in 
consumption spending. These figures are consistent with the picture 
painted above of ever-weakening domestic consumer spending. The 
annualised change in vehicle sales was down -8.1 per cent, which is a much 
reduced rate of decline, perhaps resulting from the government scrappage 
scheme. The decline in retail sales more generally has also moderated 
significantly. However, Irish people are taking fewer trips abroad, and there 
is no sign of this pattern abating. 
Table 3: Recent Indicators of Consumption (Annualised Growth Rates) 
Retail Sales (unadjusted) 
Trips 
Abroad 
New Vehicle 
Sales 
All 
Vehicle 
Sales 
All 
Businesses 
Excl Motor 
Trade 
%            % %     % % 
2009 Q1 -11.4 -5.0 -3.1 -31.9 -44.7 
2009 Q2 -13.1 -6.6 -5.0 -37.3 -53.3 
2009 Q3 -14.1 -6.9 -9.6 -46.1 -62.2 
2009 Q4 -14.0 -6.9 -10.5 -47.1 -62.5 
2010 Q1 -8.6 -5.8 -9.2 -32.1 -38.8 
2010 Q2 -4.3 -3.8 -10.4 -18.0 -8.1 
 
The KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index has fallen from a height of 
67.9 in July to 52.4 in September. This corresponds with a rating of 49.6 in 
September 2009. It would appear that the uncertainty surrounding the fate 
of the Irish banking sector and the increased awareness surrounding the 
fiscal condition, coupled with ongoing increases in unemployment, have 
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lowered consumers’ expectations of their future financial situation, as 
shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
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Our estimate for consumption in 2010 is for a fall of -½ per cent. This 
is a downward revision of our previous estimates, driven by weak 
consumption in Q2. The forecast for 2011 has also been revised 
downwards to a 1 per cent increase. This downward revision is driven by 
the larger fiscal austerity measures assumed in this Commentary, higher 
unemployment numbers and a greater degree of uncertainty. Continued 
weakness in consumption is expected to lead to a correspondingly robust 
savings rate, which is forecast to rise to 10¼ per cent in 2011. 
 
Consumer sentiment is a nebulous concept, and is one that is not easy 
to target with policy measures. Domestic spending is inversely related to 
the level of uncertainty surrounding both the cost of rescuing the banking 
system and the size and shape of future government austerity measures. 
Arguably the multi-annual budgetary framework could reduce uncertainty 
surrounding the latter. 
 
 Investment in the economy grew by 11½ per cent in Q2 2010, according 
to the latest data from the Quarterly National Accounts, as shown in Figure 9. 
This is the first quarterly increase in investment since Q3 2008, albeit from 
a much reduced base. This expansion can be accounted for by a marked 
rise in spending on aircraft in Q2 2010, which amounted to €1.2 billion. 
Investment in machinery and equipment increased by 1½ per cent in Q2 
2010 compared to the same period in 2009, however, this figure falls to  
-9½ per cent when investment in airplanes is excluded. Gross fixed capital 
investment in other areas of the economy has remained weak. Investment 
in dwellings was down 44 per cent in Q2 2010 compared to Q2 2009, while 
other buildings and construction fell by 29 per cent over the same period. 
Figure 10 charts the general decline in investment over the past two years.  
 
Investment 
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Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
  
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn
           
Housing 15.1 -41.0 -51.2 7.4 -38 ¾ -42     4.3 -5 ¼ -8 ¼ 3.9 
           
Other Building 12.9 -24.3 -33.1 8.6 -25     -32 ½ 5.8 -10     -12 ¾ 5.1 
           
Transfer Costs 1.7 -62.4 -65.7 0.6 -50     -60     0.2 -10     -15     0.2 
           
Building and   
Construction 29.7 -34.9 -44.2 16.6 -32 ¼ -37 ¾ 10.3 -8     -11     9.2 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 10.1 -19.3 -19.4 8.1 -10     -10 ½ 7.3 5     6 ¾ 7.8 
           
Total 39.8 -31.0 -37.9 24.7 -25 ½ -28 ¾ 17.6 -3 ¼ -3 ¾ 17.0 
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Figure 9: Quarter-on-Quarter Percentage Change in Investment,  
       Seasonally Adjusted  
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Figure 10: Investment, € millions 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 11, the contraction in the housing market 
continued in Q2 2010. On an annualised basis, permissions granted for 
new houses and apartments were 44 per cent lower in Q2 2010 than in Q2 
2009, while housing completions were down 49 per cent. Data from the 
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government reveal 
that there were 2,990 commencements in the first five months of the year, 
compared to 3,970 commencements over the same period in 2009. In 
relation to completions, we have revised upwards our estimate for house 
completions in 2010, from 10,000 to 12,000. This revision is largely driven 
by the latest data on completions: for the first seven months of 2010 just 
over 9,500 houses have been completed so that despite the very low levels 
of commencements, it is likely that recorded completions will total 
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approximately 12,000.  Our forecast for 2011 remains unchanged at 10,000 
house completions. 
Figure 11: Housing Statistics, Annualised, Number 
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Turning to house prices, the permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index shows 
that the pace of decline in national house prices has eased in the second 
quarter of the year, falling by 1.7 per cent. This compares to a fall of 4.8 per 
cent in Q1 2010 and a fall of 3.9 per cent in Q2 2009. The cumulative 
reduction in house prices since their peak in early 2007 is now 35 per cent, 
while house prices are 44 per cent below their peak in Dublin. Underlying 
our forecast for the housing deflator is an assumption that new house 
prices could fall by up to 50 per cent from peak by the end of 2011. 
 
Total building and construction is expected to contract by 32¼ per cent 
this year, which is similar to the reduction experienced by this sector in 
2009. Investment in machinery and equipment is expected to fall by 10 per 
cent in 2010. These combined decreases mean that total investment is 
estimated to fall by 25½ per cent in 2010. For 2011, we forecast that the 
decline will begin to level off, with total investment falling by 3¼ per cent. 
Underlying this is a forecast of the building and construction sector falling 
by a further 8 per cent, and machinery and equipment growing by 5 per 
cent. 
 
Box 1: The Ratio of House Prices to Rent  
By David Duffy 
 
The forecasts in this Commentary suggest that house prices will fall by 50 per 
cent from their peak in early 2007. This means that in 2011 we expect 
house prices to average €185,000 in the year. 
 
 
   The house price to rent ratio provides a means of comparing the cost of 
alternative types of housing tenure. In the long run these tend to move 
together. Figure 1A plots the ratio of an index of new house prices to the 
CSO’s private rent index. The ratio of house prices to rents rose sharply for 
most of the period after the mid-1990s as house prices increased at a faster 
pace than rents. Indeed, since the mid-1990s the ratio has been consistently 
above its long run average. However, having peaked in 2006 the ratio has 
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been declining rapidly, and is now back at levels last seen in the late 1990s. 
Even allowing for the further falls in house prices in 2010 and 2011 and an 
increase in rents based on the annual average between 1978 and 2009, the 
ratio of house prices to rents remains above its long run average. 
 
 
Figure 1A: New House Price to Private Rents Ratio 
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Source: New House Prices from the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government. Private rents from CSO databank. 2010 and 2011 forecasts from this 
Commentary. 
 
 
Over the course of the boom the ratio of house prices to income also rose 
dramatically. The forecasts for house prices and incomes in this Commentary 
imply that the decline in this ratio will continue in 2010 and 2011 (Figure 
1B). 
 
Figure 1B: Ratio of New House Prices to Personal Disposable  
              Income 
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The September exchequer returns suggest that the collapse in tax 
revenues which began in 2008 has ended. On a rolling annual basis, total 
exchequer tax revenues have since March shown signs of levelling off at 
around €31.5 billion (Figure 12).7 Using this measure across all the main tax 
revenue categories, the data suggest that there are clear signs of stabilisation 
since the early part of 2010 in VAT, corporation tax and transaction taxes 
(stamps, capital gains and capital acquisitions). The exception to this 
pattern is income tax returns, where the annualised total fell continuously 
up to August 2010. The September returns indicated an increase in income 
tax in that month relative to September 2009, a positive sign, however, one 
month’s returns is not as yet sufficient to conclude that income tax returns 
have stabilised. 
Figure 12: Annualised Exchequer Tax Returns on Rolling Basis 
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
D
ec-05
A
pr-06
A
ug-06
D
ec-06
A
pr-07
A
ug-07
D
ec-07
A
pr-08
A
ug-08
D
ec-08
A
pr-09
A
ug-09
D
ec-09
A
pr-10
A
ug-10
€
bi
lli
on
Source: Department of Finance.  
 
Figure 13 shows the exchequer returns for the nine months to 
September from 2005 to 2010. Total tax revenue in the nine months to 
September 2010 was €9.3 billion lower than in 2007. This is largely driven 
by a fall in VAT of €3.6 billion, a fall in transactions taxes of €3 billion and 
a fall in income tax of €1.5 billion.  Tracking total tax revenue against voted 
expenditure8 the gap has stabilised in September 2010 relative to September 
2009.  We expect this to continue for the remainder of 2010 with total 
exchequer tax revenue estimated at just over €32 billion. Assuming voted 
expenditure comes in on target, despite capital expenditure in September 
being almost €1 billion below target, this would mean that the gap between 
exchequer tax revenue and voted expenditure in 2010 will be €14 billion, 
the same as in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 A rolling annual measure is a useful metric for tracking the influence of monthly returns 
while discounting seasonal effects which are often very large in tax returns. 
8 Voted expenditure excludes, among other things, once-off payments into the National 
Pension Reserve Fund or Anglo Irish Bank. 
Government 
Spending 
and the 
Public 
Finances 
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Table 5: Public Finances  
        
 2008  
€bn 
% 
Change 
2009
€bn 
% 
Change 
2010
€bn 
% 
Change 
    2011
€bn 
        
Current Revenue 41.6 -18.6 33.9 2¼ 34.7  ½ 34.8 
   of which: Tax Revenue 40.8 -19.0 33.0 -2¼ 32.3 4½ 33.7 
Current Expenditure 44.7 1.2 45.2 5¼ 47.6 2¼ 48.7 
   of which: Voted 40.8 -1.2 40.3 0     40.3  ¼ 40.4 
        
Current Surplus -3.1  -11.4  -12.9  -13.9 
        
Capital Receipts 1.4 4.8 1.5 14¼ 1.7 -2½ 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 11.0 33.5 14.7 -53¾ 6.8 29¾ 8.8 
   of which: Voted 8.6 -19.3 6.9 -13¼ 6.0 -16¼ 5.0 
        
Capital Borrowing -9.6  -13.3  -5.2  -7.2 
        
Exchequer Balance -12.7  -24.6  -18.1  -21.1 
 as % of GNP -8.2  -18.8  -14¼  -16¼ 
        
General Government 
Balance* -13.2  -23.4  -48.9  -16.1 
 as % of GDP -7.3  -14.6  -31      -10    
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 44.4  65.6  97¼  105    
        
Net Debt as % of GDP** 22.6  38.2  67¾  74¾ 
        
 
2010 and 2011 figures are based on National Accounts estimates. 
**Net of NPRF, Social Insurance and Exchequer Balances. 
 
Figure 13: Exchequer Returns, Year Ended September 
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Despite the stabilisation of this deficit, the General Government Deficit 
in 2010 is likely to reach 31 per cent of GDP. It is very important to 
understand the composition of this figure. This figure includes the most 
recent estimate announced by the Minister for Finance on 30 September 
2010, stating that the total cost of the bank bailout monies for Anglo Irish 
Bank (€29.3 billion) and Irish Nationwide Building Society (€5.4 billion) 
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will total €34.7 billion. Of these monies €4 billion was injected in Anglo 
Irish Bank in 2009 and is included in the 14.6 per cent deficit in that year. 
Excluding the cost of Anglo, the underlying deficit for 2009 would be 
approximately 12 per cent. The remaining €30.7 billion will be included in 
the 2010 measure of the deficit, which we estimate would otherwise be 
11½ per cent of GDP, a slight improvement on 2009.  
 
At the time of writing there are no details of the likely composition of 
the forthcoming budget. The government is committed to producing a 
detailed four-year budgetary plan in early November. It seems likely, 
however, that the original plan for a package of €3 billion in cuts, including 
a reduction in capital expenditure of €1 billion, is likely to be closer to €4 
billion, or even higher. In this context, we have implemented a stylised 
package of budgetary measures equivalent to €4 billion for 2011. These 
include an increase in taxation of €1.5 billion, a cut in current expenditure 
of €1 billion, a cut in welfare payments equivalent to €500 million and a cut 
in capital expenditure of €1 billion. By our estimates this package would 
reduce the General Government Deficit to 10 per cent of GDP in 2011.  
 
Excluding the once-off costs of the bank bailout monies shows that 
there is a steady improvement in the underlying deficit.9 The discrete 
impact of this huge cost to the Exchequer is best illustrated by looking at 
the gross and net debt figures. Figure 14 shows the ratio of gross 
government debt and net government debt (net of NPRF and exchequer 
cash balances) to GDP between 2000 and 2011. By our estimation, gross 
debt ratio will exceed 105 per cent by the end of 2011. Had there been no 
bank bailout costs, this ratio would be 83 per cent.  
Figure 14: Gross Government Debt and Net Government Debt as a  
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9 The underlying deficit does include the interest costs of the additional borrowing implied 
by the bank bailout monies.   These interest costs are accrued to the deficit from the 
moment of issue of the promissory note. We have made a technical assumption that the 
interest rate paid on these notes will be 5 per cent.  
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The costs of the bank bailout monies are very large. Excluding them, the 
underlying figures show that there has been some improvement in the 
fiscal balance – from 12.1 per cent to an estimated 11½ per cent of GDP –
even within the context of a very deep recession.  However, these costs do 
add to the underlying fiscal deficit, in particular the interest bill on the bank 
bailout monies is likely to exceed €1.5 billion per annum.  In Box 2 we look 
at the government’s plan to bring the fiscal deficit (which includes interest 
costs on bank bailout monies) below 3 per cent of GDP by 2014. We use 
simulation results for both the High Growth and Low Growth scenarios from 
our publication Recovery Scenarios for Ireland: An Update of July this year. By 
our calculations, achieving a 3 per cent deficit target by 2014 under the Low 
Growth scenario could imply a package of cuts of the order of €15 billion. 
Such a package of cuts could cut 1 percentage point from the annual 
growth rate and could add over 60,000 to the level of unemployment. In 
that context a target 3 per cent deficit within 4 years would only be 
achievable at a very high cost in the real economy if the Low Growth 
scenario were to materialise.  By contrast, if the High Growth scenario were 
to materialise, then a total package of €9 billion would be required to reach 
the target by 2014. This means that the growth path over the next four 
years is critical in determining the credibility of the multi-annual budgetary 
framework plan.  
Box 2: Simple Extrapolations from Recovery Scenarios Analysis 
 
In this box we revisit some recent work published in July 2010, exploring 
recovery scenarios for the Irish economy. Recovery Scenarios for Ireland: an 
Update (RS2) was based on forecast numbers from the Spring 2010 
Commentary for 2010 and 2011, an estimate of the total bank bailout cost of 
€25 billion, and a cumulative package of cuts of €7.5 billion over the period 
2011-2014. This package of cuts was based on Stability Programme Update 
December 2009, published by the Department of Finance in the Budget 
2010 document. Based on these numbers, the medium term growth path of 
the economy was explored under two scenarios. Under the High Growth 
scenario the economy recovers fully in 2012 and the labour market moves 
back towards full employment. Under the Low Growth scenario, while 
there is significant growth, it is not sufficient to return the economy to full 
employment. 
 
   The central importance of growth in restoring stability to the public 
finances emerges from this analysis. As discussed at some length in the 
paper, the appropriate target for fiscal policy is the structural deficit. This 
excludes the once-off costs of the bank bailout monies but does include the 
interest costs of that borrowing. Figure 2A shows the RS2 estimates of this 
deficit. Excluding once-off items, the deficit in 2014 under the high growth 
scenario is estimated to be 3¼, for the low growth it is 5. More 
importantly, the path of the low growth deficit is not sustainable. 
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Figure 2A: Deficit/GDP 
 
3.3
5.1
-3
3
9
15
21
2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
%
 o
f G
D
P
High Growth Low Growth
 
 
In RS2, the fiscal cost of the bank bailout (at that time estimated at €25 
billion) identified three separate costs: 
 
1) Interest cost of the bank bailout – estimated at €1.25 billion per annum. 
2) The increase in the risk premium. 
3) The cost of holding large cash deposits. 
   Given the additional €10 billion net cost of the bank bailout announced 
in September, the interest costs of this will add approximately ½ 
percentage point to the deficit in 2014.10 A reasonable estimate would, 
therefore, suggest that the deficit under the high growth scenario is in the 
range 3½-4 and under the low growth scenario is in the range 5½-6. This 
means that to achieve a deficit of 3 per cent of GDP by 2014, the deficit 
needs to be cut by an additional one percentage point under the High 
Growth scenario and an additional 3 percentage points under the Low 
Growth scenario. 
 
   In order to estimate the likely scale of additional cuts needed to achieve 
these reductions, we can look at the analysis in RS2. In the 2011-2014 
period, an austerity package of €7.4 billion reduced the structural deficit by 
2½ per cent of GDP. A very crude rule of thumb would, therefore, suggest 
that a reduction of the structural deficit by 1 percentage point, requires a 
€2.5 to €3 billion fiscal adjustment package (Table 2A). 
                                                          
10 In RS2 the roll-out of the €25 billion bank bailout payment was treated as follows. €4 
billion paid to Anglo-Irish Bank in 2009, €11 billion of promissory notes issued in 2010, 
with a remaining €8 billion promissory notes issued in equal instalments over a subsequent 
ten year period and interest payments on these promissory notes contributing a further €2 
billion. Following the recent announcement by the Minister for Finance in September, we 
now assume that €30.7 billion in promissory notes will be issued before the end of 2010. 
This effectively adds ½ per cent to the structural deficit by 2014 relative to RS2. 
27 
 
 
Table 2A: Impact of Austerity Package on the Deficit from RS2 
   
 Package of 
Cuts 
Reduction in the Deficit 
  High Growth Low Growth 
 
2011-2014 €7.4 billion 2½ 2½ 
 
 
   RS2 also provides an estimate of the effect of such an austerity 
programme on growth. Specifically, Box A in RS2 compares the High 
Growth scenario with the World Recovery scenario published in May 2009. 
The key difference between the two scenarios relates to the €7.4 billion 
package of fiscal austerity measures included in the High Growth scenario. 
The impact of this package over the medium term (2011-2015) is to knock 
1 percentage point off the annual growth rate, with income per head 5 per 
cent lower in 2015 and total employment 63,000 lower.   
 
   While these are very simple linear extrapolations they do give us a simple 
rule of thumb in guesstimating how the economy could reach a 3 per cent 
structural deficit target by 2014. The results are shown in Table 2B below.  
Under the High Growth scenario, an additional €1.5 to €3 billion in cuts 
would be needed, this in turn would reduce annual average growth by 
between ¼ and ½ per cent per annum.   
 
   Under the Low Growth scenario, an additional €7.5 billion in cuts would 
be needed, this in turn would reduce annual average growth to 2 ¼ per 
cent per annum and could add 60,000 to the level of unemployment. This 
level of growth would not be sufficient to clear the labour market. With 
stagnant or even rising unemployment, the linear relationship between cuts 
and the deficit assumed here could break down.  There is a danger that a 
growth rate close to 2 per cent, following on a prolonged recession, could 
send the economy into a period of prolonged deflation. 
Table 2B: Deficit as Percentage of GDP 
 
 Cumulative 
2011-2014  
Fiscal 
Package 
 
         High Growth Low Growth 
  2011-2015 
Annual % 
Growth 
GDP 
 Deficit 
in 2014 
2011-2015 
Annual % 
Growth 
GDP 
Deficit 
in 2014 
      
RS2 €7.4bn 4½  3½ - 4 3¼  5½ - 6 
 
Additional 
€1.5 - €3bn 
 
€9 - €10.5bn 
 
4 - 4¼  
 
2½ - 3   
 
Additional 
€7.5bn 
 
€15bn   
 
2¼  
 
2½ - 3 
 
   The target of a 3 per cent deficit by 2014 is critically dependent on a 
strong recovery in the world economy, a healthy and functioning Irish 
banking system, no further surprises and the labour market clearing to an 
unemployment rate of 5 per cent by 2015. If these conditions were met 
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then the “high growth” scenario would be more likely to occur and the 
target could be met without substantial dislocation. However, if these 
conditions were not to materialise, so that the economy pursues the “low 
growth” scenario, then the additional cuts necessary to achieve the 3 per 
cent deficit target could tip the growth path of the economy into a 
deflationary spiral involving significant costs that might be avoided through 
a limited extension of the time scale for the adjustment. 
 
 In the latest Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) for 2010 Q2, the estimates 
suggest that exports continued to perform well in the second quarter. In 
the first quarter of 2010, the volume of exports grew by a very strong 7.5 
per cent, in the second quarter the growth rate is estimated at 1.6 per cent. 
Against a background of falling volumes in 2009, these quarterly figures 
suggest that even with no further growth in the second half of the year, 
volume growth for the year as a whole would be 7.6 per cent.  In terms of 
value, following a significant decline in export prices in 2009, more recent 
months have seen a resumption of price increases in the export sector, 
most notably in relation to merchandise exports.  
 
These latest QNA figures confirm that the export sector has emerged 
from recession and returned to growth. The total value of exports of goods 
and services in the first six months of 2010 was higher than in any previous 
six month period. In relation to the performance of goods and services 
exports, it is the performance of exports from the services sector that 
underlies this growth. Monthly data from the External Trade CSO 
publication show considerable volatility in relation to the performance of 
exports. In June the monthly change in volume exports was -4.4 per cent 
while the value change was -3.7 per cent. Preliminary figures for July 
estimate the growth in the value of merchandise exports of 8.1 per cent. 
(These are all seasonally adjusted figures.) Because of the volatility in the 
monthly numbers, it is helpful to look at the data on an annualised basis. 
Figure 15 shows the annualised total value of merchandise exports and 
imports. These data indicate that there has been an increase in total 
merchandise exports beginning in the second quarter of 2010. A very 
strong performance from the pharmaceutical sector, which alone accounts 
for more than one-quarter of all merchandise exports, and to a lesser extent 
from the food sector, has helped to offset a very poor performance in the 
computer sector whose share of total exports has fallen from over 16 per 
cent in 2007 to 6 per cent in 2010. 
 
In relation to services exports, Figure 15 plots the annualised total value 
of services imports and exports. Between the end of 2007 and 2009 the 
value of services exports fell, leading to a significant widening of the 
services trade balance. This has begun to narrow in more recent quarters 
with a resumption in exports growth. For the year ended 2010 Q2, the 
value of services exports grew by 3.6 per cent. This strong performance 
masks significant variation, with tourism and travel shrinking by almost 22 
per cent, and financial services by almost 4 per cent. This was more than 
offset by continued strong growth in business services, computer services 
and royalties and licences. 
 
 
Exports 
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Figure 15: External Trade Statistics 2001M01-2010M07 (Annualised, 
   € billion) 
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Figure 16: Total Services Exports and Imports (Annualised, € billion)  
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Given the strength of the recent export performance we have revised 
upwards our figures for exports growth in total exports in 2010 and 2011. 
We now estimate volume growth in total exports in 2010 to be 7½ per 
cent, driven by strong growth in both merchandise exports – of 7½ per 
cent – and in services exports other than tourism. Since the most recent 
data suggest that exports of tourism continue to perform poorly, we 
estimate a small decline of ½ per cent in 2010 followed by a relatively 
strong recovery in 2011 of close to 6 per cent. We forecast that exports will 
continue to grow strongly in 2011, at 5½ per cent in volume terms. In 
relation to prices, much will depend on what will happen in foreign 
exchange markets over the forecast period. The recent strengthening of the 
euro, if it persists, will lead to an improvement  in  the  terms of  trade but  
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Table 6: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn
           
Merchandise 81 -5.2 -4.9 77 7½ 7½ 83 5 ½ 6     88 
Tourism 4 -16.5 -18.2 4       - ½ -1     3 5 ¾ 8     4 
Other Services 64 -1.9 -0.8 63 8     8     68 5 ½ 5½ 72 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 149 -4.1 -3.6 144 7½ 7½ 154 5 ½ 5¾ 163 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Exports 150 -4.1 -3.6 145 7½ 7½ 156 5 ½ 5¾ 165 
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at the cost of a loss of price competitiveness. For 2010 we expect that the 
growth in export prices will marginally exceed import prices, leading to a 
terms of trade gain of 0.5 per cent. We have assumed that in 2011 there will 
be a reversal of this terms of trade gain but this is highly dependent on the 
path exchange rates take in the coming months. 
 
 The total value of imports of goods and services fell by almost 15 per 
cent from their peak in the last quarter of 2007 to their trough in the last 
quarter of 2009. In particular, there has been a dramatic decline in 
merchandise imports as can be seen in Figure 16 above. The volume of 
merchandise imports fell by over 30 per cent between 2007 and 2009. 
Imports of non-tourism services, by contrast, recorded an increase over 
this period. In 2008 the value of non-tourism services imports grew by 9.2 
per cent, before stagnating at 0.3 per cent in 2009. Imports of tourism 
services have fallen dramatically, by almost 11 per cent in 2009. This 
reflects the very strong contraction in personal consumption spending of 
11 per cent in value terms. 
 
Since the beginning of 2010, estimates from the QNA suggest that total 
imports have begun to grow again, both in value and volume terms. For 
the year ended 2010 Q2, the volume growth of imports of goods and 
services was -3.9 per cent, and the implied carryover growth rate was 3.7 
per cent.  We now estimate that volume imports of goods and services will 
grow by 3½ per cent in 2010. This represents a significant upward revision 
relative to the Summer Commentary where we expected stagnation in 
imports. This upward revision is driven by our higher estimate of exports 
in 2010. Irish exports tend to be highly import intensive, particularly in the 
services sector.  
 
 The current account of the balance of payments began to shrink rapidly 
in the middle of 2008 (see Figure 17). From a peak of -7.8 per cent of GDP 
in 2008 Q3, by 2010 Q2 it is estimated to have shrunk rapidly to -2.7 per 
cent of GDP. This has been driven by the very rapid widening in the trade 
balance on goods and services. In particular, the merchandise trade balance 
increased by over €12 billion as imports of goods shrank rapidly. Offsetting 
this, the sharp decline in services exports discussed earlier resulted in a 
widening of the services trade deficit in both 2008 and 2009. Based on our 
forecasts for exports and imports, we expect the merchandise trade balance 
to increase further and we also expect the negative services balance to 
begin to close. These projections would result in rapid growth in the overall 
trade balance and would see it move from 18.3 per cent of GNP in 2009 to 
24½ per cent in 2010 and almost 26¾ per cent in 2011. 
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Table 7: Imports of Goods and Services    
  
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
 
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn
 
Merchandise 57 -18.4 -22.0 45 3     2 ½ 46 3     4     48 
Tourism 7 -10.3 -10.8 6 -2½ -3     6 1     2     6 
Other Services 69 -2.6 0.3 69 4½ 4     72 4½ 5     75 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 133 -9.7 -9.9 120 3½ 3     123 3¾ 4½ 129 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Imports 134 -9.7 -10.1 120 3½ 3     124 3 ¾ 4½ 130 
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Figure 17: Current Account of Balance of Payments as Percentage of      
 GNP, Annualised Data 
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Offsetting this increase in the trade balance, is a widening of net factor 
income flows abroad. Having narrowed in 2008, these net outflows 
widened again in 2009. Looking at the detailed flows in the Balance of 
Payments, these suggest a very significant decline in both inflows and 
outflows of portfolio and other investment income. In 2009 total inflows 
of portfolio and other investment income fell by €28 billion while total 
outflows fell by €27 billion. In relation to outflows, there was a €4 billion 
increase in distributed profits outflows and reinvested earnings. Our 
projections for 2010 and 2011 suggest a further widening of net factor 
outflows. However, overall we expect the current account deficit to shrink 
to 0.1 per cent of GNP in 2010 and for 2011 we are forecasting a surplus 
of 1¼ per cent of GNP. Changes in the flow of funds between sectors of 
the Irish economy which match these developments in the balance of 
payments are discussed in the Monetary section. 
Table 8: Balance of Payments*  
 2008 Change 2009 Change 2010 Change 2011
 €bn % €bn % €bn % €bn
   
Merchandise Trade  Balance 23.8  32.4  37.0  40.2 
Service Trade Balance -7.7  -8.4  -6.0  -5.6 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP basis 16.1  24.0  31.1  34.5 
% of GNP 10.4  18.3  24 ½  26 ¾ 
 Total Debit Flows 109.2 -24.6 82.4 -8 ¾ 75.2 -3  72.9 
 Total Credit Flows 84.0 -35.2 54.5 -17 ½ 44.9 -9  40.9 
Net Factor Flows  -25.2 10.9 -27.9 8 ¼ -30.2 6  -32.0 
Net Current Transfers  -1.2  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9 
 
Balance on Current Account -10.2  -4.9  -0.1  1.6 
 
Capital Transfers 0.0  -1.3  0.1  0.1 
Effective Current Balance  -10.1  -6.1  0.0  1.7 
% of GNP -6.5  -4.7  0      1 ¼ 
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
34 
 Table 9 provides a range of indicators that seek to measure the 
performance of the Irish economy in the recent past, as well as forecasts of 
how they are expected to change up to the end of 2011. GNP is expected 
to decline further this year before returning to growth in 2011. GNP 
growth is forecast to be -1½ per cent in 2010 and +2 per cent in 2011. Due 
to the continuing natural increase in population, it is estimated that the fall 
in GNP per person in 2010 will be steeper than the fall in GNP. However, 
outward migration is expected to outweigh the natural increase in 
population in 2011, so that GNP per person will grow faster than GNP. 
See the Employment section below. 
 
Figure 18 shows the contribution of domestic and external demand to 
the overall rate of GDP growth.11 The data for 2008 and 2009, in addition 
to our estimates for 2010, suggest that the contractions in GDP in each of 
these three years are entirely driven by the contraction in domestic demand, 
with the external sector making a positive contribution to growth. In 2009, 
external demand contributed almost 4 per cent to overall GDP growth, its 
largest contribution since 1999. Our forecasts imply a similar contribution 
by the external sector to GDP growth in 2010. 
Figure 18: Contributions to Growth, Per Cent 
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11 The growth rates in external and domestic demand are weighted by their respective 
share in GDP. Therefore, these two growth rates sum to the overall growth in GDP.  
Measures of 
Performance 
35 
 
Table 9: Performance Indicators 
Performance Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(f) 2011(f) 
GNP, in constant prices 6.0 6.5 4.5 -3.5 -10.7 -1 ½ 2   
GNP adj for Terms of Trade 5.2 5.5 3.1 -5.9 -9.8 - ¾ 1 ½ 
GNDI, constant prices 5.1 4.9 2.8 -6.0 -9.7 - ¾ 1 ½ 
National Resources 5.0 4.9 2.6 -6.0 -10.6  ¼ 1 ½ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 3.7 4.0 1.9 -5.3 -11.4 -1 ¾ 2 ¼ 
Consumption per capita (constant prices) 4.6 4.2 3.8 -3.3 -7.8 - ¾ 1 ¼ 
Investment in Housing/GNP 14.9 14.7 13.2 9.8 5.6 3 ¼ 3   
Investment/GNP 31.4 31.2 30.8 25.7 18.8 13 ¾ 13 ¼ 
Domestic Demand 9.0 6.4 5.5 -5.2 -13.9 -4 ½ - ¼ 
Labour share of GNP 47.5 46.8 48.0 51.3 55.4 53 ¾ 52   
 
 The latest QNA (Q2 2010) showed a decline in industrial output 
(excluding building and construction) in the latest quarter, based on the 
seasonally adjusted series. As can be seen from Figure 19, this decline in 
output came after a particularly strong performance in the first quarter. 
These rates of output growth mirror the rates of export growth between 
Q1 and Q2. As discussed above in the section on Exports, the rate of 
growth in exports declined markedly between Q1 and Q2, although it 
remained positive in Q2. Somewhat surprisingly, Figure 19 also shows an 
increase in building and construction output in Q2. Of course, given the 
low base that now applies in this sector, even modest increases in activity 
will register in percentage terms. Between Q1 and Q2, the increase in 
output in the sector was €29 million. 
 
Figure 19: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Industry, Seasonally  
   Adjusted 
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Table 10: GDP by Sector    
        
 2008 % Change 2009 % Change 2010 % Change 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Agriculture 3.7 -3.6 -19.5 3.0 5     10     3.3 2     5     3.4 
           
Industry: 49.7 -7.8 -8.4 45.6 -0     -1 ½ 44.8 3 ¼ 2 ¾ 46.1 
Other Industry 37.4 -0.1 0.2 37.5 7     6     39.7 5     4 ½ 41.5 
Building & Construction 12.3 -31.4 -34.3 8.1 -31 ½ -37     5.1 -8     -10 ¾ 4.5 
           
Services: 106.1 -3.8 -9.5 96.1 - ¼ -1 ½ 94.5 1 ¾ 1 ¼ 95.6 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 6.4 -0.5 -1.2 6.4 -3     -7 ¼ 5.9 -2     -3     5.7 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 24.1 -9.3 -9.7 21.8 0     -2     21.3 2     3     21.9 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 75.6 -2.3 -10.1 67.9 - ¼ - ¾ 67.3 2     1     68.0 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  159.5 -5.0 -9.4 144.6 - ¼ -1 ¼ 142.6 2 ¼ 1 ¾ 145.1 
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The large downturn in the rate of growth in industrial activity between 
Q1 and Q2 2010 is also captured in Figure 20 where we show recent 
quarterly growth rates in the Index of Industrial Production for the modern 
and traditional sectors. The modern sector showed a particularly large jump 
in output in Q1 but this turned into a small minus in Q2. For the 
traditional sector, the impression that emerges from the figure is of a steady 
pace of recovery. Growth in this sector has now been positive in the last 
three quarters.12 
Figure 20: Quarter-On-Quarter Sectoral Growth Rates in Industrial  
         Production Index, Seasonally Adjusted 
 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2
Modern sector Traditional sector
Source: Industrial Production Index, CSO.
 
 
Turning to services, in Figure 21, we plot the quarter on quarter growth 
rates going back to Q1 2008. The first key point to be made is that the 
volatility in output is very much lower than in the case of industry. The 
largest quarter-on-quarter falls have been less than 2 per cent but the series 
barely rises above zero at any point. For the most recent quarter, output fell 
although by a negligible amount. Across the three sub-categories of 
Distribution, Transport and Communications, Public Administration and 
Defence and Other, the changes in output between Q1 and Q2 were all 
close to zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 We should note that in July and August, the index of industrial production has 
registered strong gains relative to July and August of 2009 (13.4 per cent and 10.4 per cent 
respectively). This provides a positive sign for the likely outcome for Q3. 
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Figure 21: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Services, Seasonally 
    Adjusted 
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Turning to our forecasts, we expect industrial output to grow by 7 per 
cent in 2010 and by 5 per cent in 2011. For building and construction, we 
expect a fall in output of 31½ per cent in 2010, moderating to 8 per cent in 
2011. For services, we expect a volume decline of ¼ per cent this year and 
an increase of 1¾ per cent next year. 
 
 According to the latest Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS Q2), 
there were 1.863 million people employed in the second quarter (seasonally 
adjusted). As employment peaked at 2.138 million in the fourth quarter of 
2007, the decline in the number employed since that peak is now 275,600 
or 13 per cent. The number in the labour force was 2.148 million in Q2 
2010. The peak was around Q4 2007/Q1 2008, when the labour force 
reached 2.247 million. Hence, the decline in the labour force from the peak 
to the most recent reading is 99,600, or 4.4 per cent. The number 
unemployed now stands at 284,500, compared with 108,200 in Q4 2007. 
This means that the increase in the number unemployed over this period 
was 176,000 or 163 per cent. The rate of unemployment in Q2 2010 was 
13.6 per cent; according to the Live Register, the rate of unemployment in 
September was 13.7 per cent. 
 
Clearly, these numbers are stark but it is at least possible to say that the 
pace of job loss appears to be easing. As shown in Figure 22, the fastest 
pace of job loss was experienced in Q3 of 2009 when the year-on-year rate 
of job loss reached 8.8 per cent. The pace has been easing since then, with 
the most recent figures showing a rate of job loss of 4.2 per cent. 
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Figure 22: Year-on-Year Percentage Change in Employment, Q1 2008 to 
    Q2 2010 
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We noted above that the labour force has fallen by almost 100,000 since 
the end of 2007. Some of this is explained by outward migration and also 
by falling participation. As with other variables, the participation rate 
peaked in Q4 2007 and has been declining since. At the peak, it was 64.1 
per cent but it has fallen continuously since then and stood at 61.1 per cent 
in Q2 2010.  
 
On out-migration, the Population and Migration Estimates published in 
September showed that there was a net outflow of 34,500 in the year 
ending April 2010. This was well below our forecast of 70,000. However, 
another source of CSO data on migration, (the QNHS), suggests that the 
figure of 34,500 may be an under-estimate of the actual outflow in the year 
ending April 2010 and that out forecast of 70,000 is likely to have been 
more accurate than suggested by the Population and Migration Estimates. 
According to the Population and Migration Estimates, the net outflow of 
34,500 was made up of a net outflow of 14,400 Irish nationals and 20,100 
non-nationals. However, if we compare the estimates for the number of 
non-nationals living in Ireland in Q2 2009 and Q2 2010,13 we see that the 
population is estimated to have fallen by 52,800. It should be noted that the 
figures in the Population and Migration Estimates refer to the full 
population, whereas the QNHS counts people over the age of 15 years. It 
is also the case that the time period covered differs slightly. Nevertheless, 
the discrepancy between the two sources (20,100 versus 52,800) is certainly 
suggestive of a higher net outflow relative to the level reported in the 
Population and Migration Estimates.  
 
In our last Commentary, we drew attention to two dimensions of the 
current unemployment crisis, namely, the huge rate of youth 
unemployment and the increase in long-term unemployment. The most 
                                                          
13 QNHS Table A1 
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recent figures show that the rate of unemployment for those aged 15-19 
years is now 40.6 per cent; for those aged 20-24 years, the rate is 25.8 per 
cent. The rate of long-term unemployment is now 5.9 per cent, up from 5.3 
per cent in Q1 2010. This rising level of long-term unemployment is of 
particular concern. As the probability of returning to work diminishes with 
the length of time out of work, this rapid rise points to a potential difficulty 
in reducing the rate, even in a context of increasing employment. 
 
In Box 3 below on unemployment by education level, we track the trend 
in the numbers and proportions unemployed between 1988 and 2009. The 
recent QNHS release allows us to look at this for 2010, although based on 
the ILO definition of unemployment. In Table 11, we reproduce these 
figures for Q2 2010 and the picture that emerges in the Box is seen here 
also. Less than a third of those unemployed are in the lowest two 
educational categories, that is, 88,400 or 30 per cent.  However, the rates of 
unemployment are higher in the lower educational groups. 
 
While it might seem intuitively sensible to say, based on these figures, 
that active labour market policy should focus on the biggest number of 
unemployed people, this may not be correct in reality. We know from 
many studies of unemployment that people with higher levels of education 
are more likely to return to work following a spell of unemployment 
unaided, relative to less educated people. There is no evidence to suggest 
that this pattern no longer applies in Ireland. As a result, the case can still 
be made that scarce resources, when spent on labour market training and 
employment programmes, should generally be directed towards those who 
need them most, i.e., those with greatest educational disadvantage but with 
the capacity to benefit from education or training programmes. For better 
educated groups, interventions may still be required but different sorts of 
interventions, such as internships, are likely to be needed. 
Table 11: Numbers Unemployed and Rates of Unemployment by  
        Education Group, Q2 2010 
 
Education Level Number Unemployed Unemployment Rate
 
Primary or below 
 
26.5 
 
20.5 
Lower secondary 61.9 22.9 
Higher secondary 86.4 15.4 
Post leaving cert 46.1 17.7 
Third level non-honours 
degree 
29.9 9.0 
Third level honours 
degree or above 
33.0 6.7 
Other 9.0 14.5 
Total persons aged 15-64 
years 
292.9 13.9 
   
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect the numbers employed to average 
1.86 million this year. This would represent a fall of 68,000 relative to the 
annual average in 2009, or 3.5 per cent. We expect a further fall in the 
number employed in 2011, with the number now forecast at 1.85 million. 
On unemployment, we expect the rate to average 13¼ per cent in 2010 and 
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13½ per cent in 2011. We expect net outward migration to be 60,000 in the 
year ending April 2011 (Table 12). 
Table 12: Employment and Unemployment  
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2008  2009   2010     2011
  
Agriculture 115 96 85 88 
Industry 520 411 367 360 
Services 1,465 1,422 1,408 1,401 
Total at Work 2,100 1,929 1,860 1,850 
Unemployed 141 259 286 289 
  
Labour Force 2,241 2,187 2,146 2,139 
Unemployment Rate % 6.3 11.8 13 ¼ 13 ½ 
Net Migration 38.5 -7.8 -34.5 -60.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 83.8 57.3 30.8 15.0 
Change in Participation Rate* -0.3 -1.2 -1      ½ 
     
Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; based on Q2 
figures as are migration figures. 
Box 3: Unemployment by Education (LFS/QNHS Data) 
 
There has been a significant change in the educational profile of the 
unemployed since the late 1980s. There had been a steady decline in 
numbers unemployed with primary and junior educational attainment 
(Table 3A), but the recent recession has led to a dramatic rise in the 
numbers unemployed with Leaving Certificate level education, particularly 
in 2009 (see Table 3A). There is also a significant difference in relation to 
education levels by gender. The proportion of the unemployed with higher 
levels of education (leaving and third level) in total unemployment is 
consistently higher for females (77 per cent in 2009). This could be the 
result of less educated women being more likely to describe themselves as 
being non-participants, as opposed to an underlying difference in the 
employment prospects of more educated men and women. 
 
Table 3A: Numbers Unemployed by Education Level  
        
 1988 1993 2001 2004 2007 2008 2009 
        
Total        
Primary 99 80 39 33 29 27 45 
Junior 
Certificate 67 79 22 29 31 39 68 
Leaving 
Certificate 38 49 26 32 41 52 132 
Third level 12 21 9 16 20 24 60 
Total 217 229 97 111 121 143 305 
Female        
Primary 13 12 8 5 5 4 7 
Junior 
Certificate 16 19 7 7 9 7 11 
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Leaving 
Certificate 15 20 12 12 17 18 36 
Third level 5 9 4 7 9 11 25 
Total 49 59 32 31 38 40 79 
Male        
Primary 86 69 32 28 24 23 38 
Junior 
Certificate 52 60 15 22 22 32 57 
Leaving 
Certificate 23 29 14 20 25 35 95 
Third level 7 12 5 9 11 13 35 
Total 168 170 66 79 82 103 226 
 
Source: CSO Labour Force Survey data. All of these data are on a PES basis. 
 
Figure 3A: Unemployment Rates by Educational Level 
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   Figure 3A shows unemployment rates within each educational category. 
The familiar pattern emerges; people with lower levels of education have a 
much higher probability of being unemployed than those with higher levels 
of education. In 2009, the unemployment rate of those with Junior 
Certificate education was over 22 per cent; for those with primary level 
education, the rate was over 26 per cent. These are similar to the 
unemployment rates seen in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the 
change in the educational composition of the work force means that  while 
the unemployment rates are much higher for those with lower levels of 
education the actual numbers unemployed are now concentrated in those 
with higher levels of education.   
 
   As noted in the section on employment, care must be taken when 
distilling policy implications. State-funded labour market interventions 
should be aimed at those in greatest need of assistance and not necessarily 
at those who make up the greatest numbers of unemployed people. 
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In Table 13, we show the year-on-year changes in earnings, both hourly 
and weekly, and also changes in hours worked for Q1 2010. The first point 
to be made is that hourly earnings averaged across all sectors registered a 
decline. This is noteworthy because up to this point no such decline in 
overall earnings had shown up in the data, in spite of the very depressed 
conditions in the labour market. For example, in Q4 2009 hourly earnings 
were shown to have increased by 0.9 per cent across all sectors. Weekly 
earnings in Q4 2009 did register a decline (0.6 per cent) but this resulted 
from a fall in hours worked (1.5 per cent). In Table 13 we see that hours 
worked also fell in Q1 2010. 
Table 13: Year-on-Year Percentage Change in Earnings and Hours  
        Worked, All Employees, 2010 Q1 
    
 
Weekly Earnings Hourly Earnings Weekly Hours 
Worked 
    
All NACE economic 
sectors 
-3.8 -1.5 -2.2 
  Industry (B to E) -0.8 0.5 -1.1 
  Mining and  
quarrying (B) 
0.8 2.2 -1.3 
  Manufacturing (C) -0.7 0.4 -1.1 
  Electricity, water 
supply and waste 
management (D,E) 
-4.9 -1.3 -3.7 
  Construction (F) -3.5 -2.6 -1.1 
  Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (G) 
-3.1 -1.1 -2.0 
  Transportation and 
storage (H) 
-7.3 -6.5 -0.8 
  Accommodation and 
food service 
activities (I) 
-4.8 -1.4 -3.5 
  Information and 
communication (J) 
-4.1 -2.0 -2.2 
  Financial, insurance 
and real estate 
activities (K,L) 
1.0 1.5 -0.6 
  Professional, scientific 
and technical 
activities (M) 
0.8 3.1 -2.1 
  Administrative and 
support service 
activities (N) 
-1.5 0.0 -1.3 
  Public administration 
and defence; 
compulsory social 
security (O) 
-6.3 -4.1 -2.2 
Source: Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), CSO. 
 
Looking across the sectors, it can be seen that falls in hourly wages are 
now broadly based. Seven of the thirteen sectors show wage falls. The 
biggest fall is in transport and storage, at 6.5 per cent, with the second 
largest fall being in public administration and defence, at 4.1 per cent. The 
biggest rise was experienced in professional, scientific and technical 
activities, where an hourly wage increase of 3.1 per cent was recorded. 
Incomes 
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Excluding bonuses, the rise in this sector was essentially the same (3 per 
cent) so the rise cannot be explained by bonuses. All sectors show declines 
in hours worked per week. 
 
Another comparison of interest relates to movements in public sector 
and private sector earnings. In Q1 2010, public sector hourly earnings had 
fallen by 3.7 per cent year-on-year whereas private sector hourly earnings 
had fallen by 0.4 per cent. The estimates of public sector earnings do not 
take account of the pension levy introduced in Q2 2009. The fall in hours 
was greater in the private sector (2.5 per cent versus 1.9 per cent in the 
public sector). On balance, the fall in weekly earnings in the public sector 
(at 5.5 per cent) exceeded that in the private sector (2.8). 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect wages to fall by 3 per cent in 2010 
due to on-going weakness in the labour market as discussed in the 
Employment section above. When combined with our expectation of 
employment falls, this implies a fall in non-agricultural wages of 6 per cent. 
Personal disposable income is expected to fall by 2¾ per cent. With 
consumption falling at a similar rate, this implies that the savings rate will 
remain over 10 per cent in 2010. It reached this level in 2009, having been 
5.2 per cent in 2008 and 3.5 per cent in 2007. For 2011, we expect wages to 
fall again but at the more modest pace of 1 per cent. With employment 
expected to stabilise in 2011, the fall in non-agricultural wages will be 
modest relative to 2010, at 1¾ per cent. Personal disposable income is 
expected to rise by 2¾ per cent in 2011, driven largely by an increase in 
other non-agricultural income. With consumption expected to grow by 2 
per cent, the savings rate is forecast to remain above 10 per cent again in 
2011. 
Box 4: Homes Repossession Cases – Some Preliminary Findings 
 
By David Duffy 
 
The economic downturn has contributed to severe difficulties for 
households. In the housing market this is evidenced by the rise in the 
number of mortgages reported to be in arrears and properties abandoned, 
surrendered or repossessed. Since September 2009 the Financial Regulator 
has published quarterly residential mortgage arrears and repossessions 
statistics. Despite the downturn in the housing market and the economy 
the growing number of mortgages in arrears has, to date, not translated into 
a substantial increase in repossessions. The latest data show that the total 
number of properties repossessed in the twelve month period to end-June 
was 387.14 However, there is evidence of the difficulties being faced by 
households in the number of households voluntarily surrendering or 
abandoning their properties over the last nine months. 
 
   Towards the end of July this year the Master of the High Court 
announced that 600 new cases for repossession had come onto his list 
since June15. The lending institutions in these repossession cases that had 
                                                          
14 Financial Regulator, “Residential Mortgage Arrears and Repossession Statistics”, Press 
Release September 1, 2010. 
15 “Court gets 600 cases to repossess homes”, The Irish Times, July 21, 2010. 
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come before the court were asked by the Master to provide information on 
the location of the property, whether or not it was the borrower’s primary 
residence, the marital status of the borrower, the type of residence, the 
extent of the arrears, the size of the original mortgage and year of loan 
drawdown, as well as the type of lending institution. The anonymised raw 
data were given to the ESRI for analysis. This note outlines the main 
results. Around 540 cases (90 per cent) relate to mortgages and are not 
commercial loans. In the majority of cases repossession related to the 
family home (79 per cent), 2 per cent to properties that were unoccupied or 
abandoned, and 19 per cent to property that was not the borrower’s 
residence. For some of the last group this includes land or sites. The 
following analysis is of those repossession cases that could be identified as 
relating to the borrower’s residence.  
 
   Most of the repossession cases related to married couples or joint 
mortgages (63 per cent), with single borrowers accounting for nearly 29 per 
cent, while divorced, separated or widowed account for just over 8 per 
cent. Sub-prime lenders account for nearly 85 per cent of repossession 
cases16. Dublin accounts for 13 per cent of cases, followed by Tipperary 
(7.6 per cent), Galway and Meath (7.3 per cent each), Louth and Cork (6.1 
per cent each) and Kildare, (5.9 per cent). The data also show that the 
majority of those facing repossession borrowed late in the housing boom – 
mortgages taken out in 2006 and 2007 account for over 72 per cent of 
cases. 
 
Figure 4A: Repossession Cases by Year of Drawdown 
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Source: Anonymised Data from the Master of the High Court and Own Calculations. 
 
 
   The data show that for repossession cases the average loan on a 
borrower’s residence is nearly €236,000. Average arrears are nearly €30,000. 
The average ratio of arrears to original loan size is 13.2 per cent. The 
average loan size peaked for those mortgages drawndown in 2007 at 
                                                          
16 Sub-prime lending is generally lending where a higher rate of interest than normal 
market rates is charged on the loan on the basis that the applicant borrower is perceived to 
be a greater credit risk. 
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€261,400 but average arrears are highest for mortgages drawndown in 
2008, at over €35,000. The data show that there is quite a distribution in 
the amount of arrears. Figure 4B suggests that some borrowers face 
repossession based on relatively low arrears. 
 
Figure 4B: Repossession Cases, Distribution of Arrears 
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   The data show that the majority of those who currently face repossession 
borrowed from subprime lenders. It is also noteworthy that most 
repossessions relate to married couples and the family home rather than to 
investment properties. Finally, most repossession cases related to 
borrowers who took out a mortgage late in the house price cycle. 
 
 Following a period of rapid decline, consumer prices have been increasing 
modestly since the start of 2010. According to the latest figures from the 
CSO, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 0.2 per cent in August 2010, 
compared to August 2009, as can be seen in Figure 23. This is the first year 
on year increase in consumer prices since December 2008. 
Figure 23: Price Indices – Year-On-Year Percentage Change 
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Table 14: Personal Disposable Income    
2008 Change 2009 Change      2010 Change 2011 
 
€bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn
           
Agriculture, etc. 2.9 -24.4 -0.7 2.2 10     0.2 2.4 5     0.1 2.5 
Non-Agricultural Wages 79.4 -8.5 -6.7 72.7 -6     -4.4 68.3 -1 ¾ -1.2 67.1 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.6 -18.3 -3.0 13.6 7 ½ 1.0 14.6 29 ¼ 4.2 18.8 
           
Total Income Received 98.9 -10.6 -10.5 88.4 -3 ½ -3.2 85.2 3 ¾ 3.2 88.4 
Current Transfers 24.6 8.8 2.2 26.7 1     0.3 27.0 - ¼ -0.1 26.9 
           
Gross Personal Income 123.4 -6.7 -8.3 115.1 -2 ½ -2.9 112.2 2 ¾ 3.1 115.3 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.4 -8.0 -1.9 21.6 -1 ½ -0.3 21.2 3 ¼ 0.7 21.9 
           
Personal Disposable Income  100.0 -6.4 -6.4 93.6 -2 ¾ -2.6 91.0 2 ¾ 2.4 93.4 
Consumption 94.8 -11.1 -10.5 84.3 -2 ½ -2.1 82.2 2     1.7 83.9 
Personal Savings 5.2   9.2   8.8   9.5 
Savings Ratio 5.2   9.9   9 ¾   10 ¼ 
Average Personal Tax Rate 19.0   18.7   19       19     
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As discussed in previous editions of the Commentary, the mortgage 
interest component is a strong driver of variation in the CPI. Amidst 
aggressive cuts to ECB interest rates, mortgage interest rates fell 48.7 per 
cent from their height in October 2008 to August 2009. In the year since 
then, mortgage interest rates have increased by 28.6 per cent. This is a 
result of the increased borrowing costs facing Irish banks. The Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) seeks to measure the price level 
excluding mortgage interest. By this measure, prices fell -1.2 per cent 
between August 2009 and August 2010 as seen in Figure 23. 
 
Further upward pressure on consumer prices has come from the 
increasing cost of education, in particular from the rising cost of third level 
education. Overall, education costs increased 9.5 per cent in the year to 
August, whereas the price of tertiary education increased by 21 per cent. 
Other significant year-on-year price increases include the price of air 
transport, which increased 18¼ per cent, and the price of liquid fuels, 
which increased by 26¾ per cent. 
 
These price increases are offset by further decreases in many other 
commodity groups. The ongoing weakness of sterling versus the euro, 
coupled with weak domestic demand, has meant that clothing and footwear 
prices have continued to fall over the past year, with prices 8.2 per cent 
lower than in August 2009. Food prices have fallen by 3.2 per cent year-on-
year, although much of this decline occurred in late 2009 with prices 
remaining stagnant throughout 2010. 
 
In the General Assessment of the Winter 2008 Commentary, the inherent 
dangers of negative price inflation were discussed. On-going price declines 
can create an expectation amongst consumers that prices will fall further in 
the future, which creates an incentive to postpone consumer spending. 
Under this scenario, debt burdens – for individuals, institutions, and the 
government – become more expensive in real terms due to an increase in 
the real interest rate. Lower prices and a greater real debt burden reduce 
demand in the economy, forcing additional price reductions, leading to a 
deflationary cycle. However, if the decline in the price level is not 
persistent, it can have the potentially positive effect of raising the value of 
real nominal incomes. Temporary negative inflation also improves 
competitiveness through reduced costs, which increases the return on 
investment in the economy. For this reason, whether or not the declining 
price level is persistent is of vital importance to the economy. 
 
The CPI is estimated to fall by ¾ per cent in 2010. This is a downward 
revision of our earlier forecasts, due to later than expected increases in the 
mortgage interest rate. The HICP is expected to fall by 1½ per cent this 
year, which represents a small upward revision of our previous estimate due 
to the moderation of the price declines for many of the non-mortgage 
interest rate commodity categories. Positive price inflation is expected to 
return next year, with the CPI forecast to increase by 1¾ per cent and the 
HICP forecast to increase by ½ per cent. 
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PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT AND DEPOSITS 
The annual rate of change in loans to households, which accounts for 
around 43 per cent of the overall stock of private sector credit outstanding, 
turned negative in October 2009 and that decline has persisted in recent 
months according to the latest statistics from the Central Bank (Table 15).17 
Underlying the fall in the overall stock of loans to households has been 
ongoing falls in lending for house purchase as well as lending for 
consumption and other purposes. Lending for house purchases declined by 
-0.7 per cent in August reflecting the ongoing weakness of activity in the 
property market. Lending for consumption purposes declined in March 
2009 for the first time since the series began in January 2003. The annual 
rate of change stood at close to -14 per cent in July and August 2010.  The 
level of credit outstanding to households peaked in mid-2008 at around 
€156 billion.  
 
Table 15: Private Sector Credit and Deposits 
    
Credit to 
Households, 
€ Million 
Adjusted 
Annual % 
Change 
Credit to 
Households 
for House 
Purchase,  
€ Million 
 
Credit to 
Households 
for House 
Purchase, 
Annual % 
Change 
Irish 
Private 
Sector 
Deposits, 
€ Million 
Households' 
Deposits,  
€ Million 
        
2008   March 154,717  14.5 125,091  15.5 175,272  83,352  
  June 151,289  13.3 121,260  14.2 176,929  84,301  
   September 153,320  12.1 122,791  12.7 179,204  85,251  
   December 144,576  8.3 114,978  9.8 176,207  85,247  
2009  March 148,800  6 114,266  7.8 182,192  97,566  
  June 147,943  2.9 114,306  4.8 183,839  98,462  
   September 141,327  0.2 110,146  1.9 182,782  98,076  
   December 140,085  -1.1 110,210  0.6 183,761  99,148  
2010  March 137,345  -2.6 109,434  -0.2 183,625  98,115  
  June 140,188  -4.5 107,676  -1.5 180,420  97,253  
  August 139,078  -3.9 107,411  -0.7 178,696  96,470  
        
 
The new statistics provide information on transactions or flows of credit 
on a monthly basis. The net flow of lending to the household sector was 
€228 million during August 2010, the first positive net monthly flow in 
2010. Prior to August, the net flow of household lending had been negative 
in fourteen of the previous eighteen months as the repayment of loans by 
the household sector exceeded the drawdown of new credit. The positive 
net flow of household lending during August was the result of loan 
                                                          
17 The Central Bank published the new series of money and credit data in Money and 
Banking Statistics in August 2010. This release replaces the previously published Monthly 
Statistics. The credit growth rates published in this release are based solely on underlying 
transactions and exclude all valuation effects including foreign exchange movements, 
increased provisions or write-downs and reclassifications etc.  
Monetary 
Sector 
Developments 
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drawdowns relating to house purchase exceeding loan repayments by €309 
million. The net flow of lending for consumption remained negative (-€84 
million) during August for the fourteenth consecutive month.  
 
Lending to the non financial corporate (NFC) sector18  accounts for 
around 34 per cent of the stock of private sector credit outstanding. The 
annual rate of change in loans to this sector has been negative since late 
2009 and that trend has continued during 2010. The decline in lending to 
the NFC sector has been driven by the contraction in longer-term loans; 
the stock of these loans fell by almost 11 per cent on an annual basis in 
August 2010. In contrast, the rate of change in NFC loans of up to one 
year maturity (includes the use of short-term credit facilities such as 
overdrafts) has remained positive over the course of 2009 and 2010. 
Growth in short-term NFC loans averaged 6.3 per cent in the three months 
to August 2010.  
 
Household deposits account for over half of total private sector 
deposits in Irish resident credit institutions. The annual rate of change in 
household deposits fell sharply during 2009 and 2010 and turned negative 
in May 2009 (Table 15). Despite this recent decline, the level of household 
deposits in August 2010 was 13 per cent higher than in August 2008. At the 
same time, the level of household sector debt outstanding has been 
declining due to increased write-downs and bad-debt provisions as well as 
the repayment of debt exceeding the new drawdown of credit since late 
2009. As a result, the ratio of household loans outstanding to household 
deposits has declined sharply over the course of 2009 and 2010 as shown in 
Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24: Ratio of Household Loans to Household Deposits 
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18 This is defined as private and public institutional units involved in the production of 
goods and non-financial services. 
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Reflecting the weakness in consumer spending, the number of credit 
cards in issue declined for sixteen consecutive months between February 
2009 and April 2010. The number of cards in issue increased during May 
before falling in each of the three months to the end of August 2010. As 
shown in Figure 25, the number of credit cards in circulation at the end of 
August 2010 was back to the level of September 2007. The year-on-year 
growth in outstanding credit card debt moderated sharply over the course 
of 2008 and 2009 as shown in Figure 25 with the rate of change turning 
negative in early 2010. Personal indebtedness on credit cards stood at just 
over €3 billion in August 2010, a reduction of over 1 per cent compared to 
August 2009.  
 
Figure 25: Credit Card Statistics 
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Deleveraging by the household and company sector, as shown in the 
latest statistics on private sector debt outstanding, is reflected by 
developments in the flow of funds in the Irish economy (Figure 26). The 
household sector recorded large deficits between 2003 and 2008 related to 
the increase in households’ borrowing to fund investment in housing. Our 
forecasts imply that as a result of the decline in the financing needs of the 
household sector as well as the increase in the savings rate, the rate of net 
acquisitions of the household sector should remain in surplus in 2010 and 
2011. As the private sector continues to repair its balance sheet, this should 
contribute to a reduction in the overall liabilities of the banking system. 
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Figure 26: Flow of Funds in the Irish Economy 
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 The latest Irish results from the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey point to 
an ongoing tightening in credit supply standards to both households and 
enterprises while demand for credit also remains weak. Credit standards on 
loans to enterprises were unchanged during Q2 2010 but tightened 
marginally on loans to households for house purchase, as shown in Table 
16 and Figure 27. Increased risk perception contributed to the tightening of 
credit standards on loans to enterprises while the cost of funds and balance 
sheet constraints were the factors cited as affecting credit standards on 
loans to households for house purchase.  
Table 16: Irish Responses to ECB Bank Lending Survey, Change in Credit 
  Standards from Previous Quarter 
 
Q2 
2009 
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Q2 
2010 
Enterprises Overall 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 3 
Loans to SMEs 2.75 3 2.75 3 3 
Loans to large 
enterprises 2.25 2.5 2.25 2.5 3 
Short-term loans 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 3 
Long-term loans 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 3 
Households House purchase 2.5 2.75 3 2.75 2.75 
Consumer credit 
and other lending 2.75 3 3 2.75 3 
1 = tightened considerably; 2 = tightened somewhat; 3 = basically unchanged; 4 = eased 
somewhat; 4 = eased considerably. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit 
Conditions 
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Figure 27: Credit Supply Conditions as Reported by Banks, Change from 
    Previous Quarter 
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Figure 27 shows that credit standards on loans to households and 
enterprises have been tightening since mid-2007. Banks were asked two ad-
hoc questions in the July version of the Bank Lending Survey. Irish banks 
reported that access to wholesale markets deteriorated over the previous 
three months and that they expected a further deterioration over the next 
three months. In addition, banks responded that ongoing financial market 
uncertainty continued to impact their capital position. Both of these factors 
have contributed to the tightening in credit standards which has taken place 
since 2007 (Figure 27). 
BANK FUNDING 
As noted in previous Commentaries, in discussing the liabilities of the 
banking system it is important to distinguish between the liabilities of Irish 
owned banks and the liabilities of all credit institutions located in Ireland.  
At the end of August 2010, the liabilities of all financial institutions resident 
in Ireland amounted to €1,309 billion. However, the liabilities of Irish 
owned banks were €582 billion, less than half of total liabilities, and not all 
of these are covered by the government guarantee.19 The difference 
between the figure for total liabilities and the liabilities of Irish owned 
banks is due to the presence of foreign credit institutions in Ireland, mostly 
IFSC companies.  
 
Since the heightening of tensions in interbank lending markets in late 
2008, the Eurosystem has provided liquidity to Central Banks through its 
Longer Term Refinancing Operations and through the adoption of a series 
of non-standard measures. The adoption of these measures contributed to 
                                                          
19 The total value of liabilities covered by the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme at 30 
June 2010 was €153 billion. An updated figure for the value of guaranteed liabilities will be 
available from mid-November.  
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a gradual improvement in money market conditions over the course of 
2009 and early 2010. The contagion from the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
during April and May caused renewed tension in Euro Area bank funding 
markets. As a result, the ECB announced the establishment of the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP)20 as well as the continuation of its  
3-month and 6-month longer-term refinancing operations.  
 
Credit institutions’ borrowing from the Irish Central Bank as part of 
Eurosystem monetary policy operations peaked in June 2009 at over €130 
billion, equivalent to over a fifth of total Eurosystem net lending to credit 
institutions in the Euro Area (Table 17 and Figure 28). Credit institutions 
borrowing from the Central Bank fell for 5 consecutive months from mid-
2009 signalling a reduction in banks’ dependence on Central Bank funds. 
Table 17: Credit Institutions’ Borrowing from the Central Bank in Millions 
Borrowing 
from the 
Eurosystem  
Relating to 
Monetary 
Policy 
Operations 
Eurosystem 
Net Lending to 
Euro Area 
Credit 
Institutions in 
Euro, Related 
to MPO 
Irish 
Share 
Credit 
Institutions' 
Borrowing 
from the 
Central 
Bank, % of 
GDP 
 
2007 March 24,020 421,633 5.7 12.7 
June 25,535 438,038 5.8 13.5 
September 23,751 420,169 5.7 12.5 
December 39,449 475,324 8.3 21.0 
2008 March 34,395 483,600 7.1 19.0 
June 38,373 460,645 8.3 21.2 
September 58,671 471,362 12.4 39.2 
December 88,562 613,857 14.4 54.0 
2009 March 120,628 607,356 19.9 79.8 
June 130,423 615,980 21.2 83.9 
September 91,573 583,939 15.7 53.9 
December 90,899 564,495 16.1 56.9 
2010 March 82,573 511,471 16.1 52.0 
June 90,473 534,859 16.9 56.9 
August 95,062 427,252 22.2 59.8 
September21 119,106 446,830 26.7 75.0 
 
 
                                                          
20 Under the SMP, the Eurosystem will purchase Euro Area public and private debt 
securities in secondary markets in order to enhance liquidity in these markets. To sterilise 
the impact of these interventions, specific operations will be conducted to re-absorb the 
liquidity injected through the Securities Markets Programme. 
21 The figure for September relates to lending to Euro Area credit institutions relating to 
monetary policy operations. The September figure for banks’ borrowing from the 
Eurosystem relating to monetary policy operations is not yet available, however, the two 
series have tracked each other closely over recent years.  
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However, recent months have seen a reversal of this trend with credit 
institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank reaching €95.1 billion in 
August and almost €120 billion in September, equivalent to 75 per cent of 
GDP and over a quarter of total Eurosystem net lending to Euro Area 
banks. The sharp increase in banks’ borrowing from the Central Bank in 
September coincided with the maturity of a large quantity of Irish banks’ 
bonds during the month. This highlights the ongoing difficulty faced by 
Irish banks in accessing wholesale funding markets since the second 
quarter of this year, as reflected in the responses to the Bank Lending Survey 
discussed earlier. 
 
The level of credit institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank 
(related to Eurosystem monetary policy operations) in recent months is 
evidence of the importance to the Irish banking system of the measures 
introduced by the ECB in order to ensure depth and liquidity in Euro Area 
bank funding markets at a time of heightened tensions.  
Figure 28: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System and Banks’ 
Borrowing from the Central Bank, % of GDP 
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 On September 30 the government and the Central Bank announced the 
latest in a series of measures aimed at resolving the banking crisis and 
ensuring that Irish banks are in a position to lend to households and 
businesses as the economy recovers. The section below contains a timeline 
of the measures implemented by the government since September 2008 in 
response to the financial crisis.  
 
The estimates of the cost to the State of government support to the 
banking system have increased a number of times since late 2008. Table 18 
details the level of State support to the banking system based on the 
announcements by the authorities on September 30. The potential fiscal 
costs of the current crisis can be separated into three different elements: 
 
• The recapitalisation of Bank of Ireland, AIB and EBS; 
Latest Steps 
in Resolving 
the Banking 
Crisis 
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• The recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide 
Building Society and; 
• National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). 
 
 
The gross cost of the recapitalisation of the five main Irish banks 
currently stands at over €42 billion, or 26 per cent of GDP. Assuming that 
the State will eventually recoup the value of its investments in Bank of 
Ireland, AIB and EBS, the net cost to the state of the bank rescue could 
amount to almost €35 billion or 22 per cent of GDP. This figure is based 
on the authorities’ most recent estimate of the level of capital required by 
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society.  
 
The Central Bank has determined that under a severe stress scenario, the 
gross cost of the recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank could increase by €5 
billion to almost €35 billion. In addition, the State is likely to have to invest 
a further €3.7 billion in AIB in order to ensure that the bank meets the 
regulator’s capital target by the end of 2010.22 Including the cost of 
covering the potential additional losses in Anglo Irish Bank increases the 
estimate of the eventual net cost of the bank bailout to €39.7 billion or 25 
per cent of GDP.  
Table 18: Overview of Existing and Estimated State Support to the  
Banking System 
Cost of Bank Recapitalisation € billion % of GDP 
Allied Irish Bank (1) 3.5 2.2 
Bank of Ireland (2) 3.5 2.2 
EBS Building Society (3) 0.4 0.2 
 
 
Anglo Irish Bank (4) 29.3 18.4 
Irish Nationwide Building Society (5) 5.4 3.4 
 
 
Total gross cost to date (6)=(1+2+3+4+5) 42.1 26.3 
Total net cost to date (7)=(4+5) 34.7 21.7 
 
 
Potential Additional Cost     
Anglo Irish Bank (8) 5.0 3.1 
AIB (9) 3.7 2.3 
Total potential gross cost (10)=(6+8+9) 50.8 31.8 
Total potential net cost (11)=(7+8) 39.7 24.9 
 
 
Payment planned for loans under NAMA (12) 40.0 25.1 
Total government involvement in the banking system (13)=(10+12) 90.8 56.8 
                                                          
22 On September 30, the government announced that the National Pension Reserve Fund 
Commission (NPRFC) would underwrite in full the placing and offer to AIB shareholders 
of AIB shares to the value of €5.4 billion. If necessary, the underwriting commitment will 
be met by the conversion of up to €1.7 billion of the NPRFC’s existing preference shares 
into ordinary shares along with a new cash investment of €3.7 billion. Any further shortfall 
in the bank’s capital requirement will be met by the conversion of a proportion of the 
bank’s remaining €1.8 billion preference shares.  
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The figures for the net cost of the bank rescue in Table 18 assume that 
the State recovers in full the value of its investments in Bank of Ireland, 
AIB and EBS. In return for the dividend owed to the State in respect of 
the preference shares it received under the recapitalisation agreement, the 
NPRF has acquired substantial stakes in both Bank of Ireland and AIB as 
documented in the section below. It should be noted that although the 
State’s investments (through the NPRF) in Bank of Ireland and AIB may 
eventually yield a return, this has not been a costless transaction. As shown 
in the NPRF’s Annual Report for 2009, the fund’s Discretionary Investment 
Portfolio (the NPRF excluding the preference shares held in Bank of 
Ireland and AIB) earned a return of 20.6 per cent in 2009. This compares 
to a return of zero in the fund’s Directed Investments in Bank of Ireland 
and AIB. 23 This indicates that a potential gain of €1.4 billion was foregone 
in 2009, assuming that the €7 billion invested in the two banks could have 
earned a return similar to the fund’s Discretionary Investment Portfolio.  
 
At between 22 and 25 per cent of GDP, the current estimate of the net 
fiscal cost of resolving the banking crisis is manageable but, nonetheless, 
represents an enormous cost to the State at a time of unprecedented 
economic challenges. In addition to the fiscal cost, Honohan (2002)24 
identifies two other channels through which a banking crisis impacts on the 
macroeconomy. The first of these is the stock component – the waste of 
resources, which would include the houses built that are unlikely ever to be 
occupied, the costs incurred by those who fail to meet their mortgages, and 
the wipe out of important financial institutions. The second, which 
Honohan refers to as the flow component, is the slump in the economy 
that has occurred as a result of the banking crisis. While it will only be 
possible to determine the full impact of these channels over time, both of 
these costs, in addition to the fiscal costs, have greatly aggravated the pain 
of the banking crisis in Ireland. 
 
 
Measures implemented by the Government (September 2008 – 
September 2010) in Response to the Financial Crisis 
 
20 September 2008 Statutory Deposit Guarantee: 
 
Increase in the statutory limit for the deposit 
guarantee scheme for banks and building societies 
from €20,000 to €100,000 per depositor per 
institution. The cover applies to 100 per cent of 
each individual’s deposit. 
                                                          
23 Bank of Ireland and AIB were due to pay €250 million and €280 million respectively as 
cash dividends on the NPRF’s preference share investments in the two banks. The 
European Commission have requested that discretionary coupon payments on tier 1 and 
upper tier 2 capital instruments in Bank of Ireland and AIB, which includes the 
government preference shares, not be paid while they discuss the banks’ restructuring 
plans. In lieu of the dividend payments, the state has acquired ordinary shares in both 
banks.  
24 Honohan, P., 2002. ‘Comment on “Costs of Banking System Instability: Some 
Empirical Evidence”’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.26, No. 5, pp. 857-860. 
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30 September 2008 Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Scheme 
   2008: 
Guarantee arrangement with six Irish financial 
institutions25 to safeguard all deposits (retail, 
commercial, institutional and inter-bank), covered 
bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt 
(lower tier II), effective from 30 September 2008 
until 29 September 2010. The guarantee is provided 
at a charge to the institutions concerned and is 
subject to specific terms and conditions. This 
guarantee scheme was also offered to certain 
foreign-owned banks26 on 9 October. In June 2009 
legislation was passed allowing for the extension of 
this guarantee arrangement beyond September 2010 
if deemed necessary by the Minister for Finance.27 
 
 
21 January 2009 Nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank: 
As result of both a weakening of the bank’s funding 
position and the serious reputational damage arising 
from unacceptable practices within the bank, Anglo 
Irish Bank was taken into public ownership. 
 
 
11 February 2009 Recapitalisation of AIB and Bank of Ireland: 
Agreement reached on a recapitalisation package, 
with the main features of the government’s 
investment as follows28: 
 
• The government will provide €3.5billion in 
Core Tier 1 capital for each bank. In return, 
the Minister will get preference shares with a 
fixed dividend of 8 per cent payable in cash 
or ordinary shares in lieu. 
• The recapitalisation programme will be 
funded from the National Pensions Reserve 
Fund. €4billion will come from the Fund’s 
current resources while €3billion will be 
provided by means of a frontloading of the 
Exchequer contributions for 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, Irish 
Nationwide Building Society and the Educational Building Society (EBS). 
26 Ulster Bank, First Active, Halifax Bank of Scotland, IIB Bank and Postbank. 
27 Financial Measures (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2009. 
28 For full details see www.finance.gov.ie  
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7 April 2009  National Asset Management Agency (NAMA): 
In the Supplementary Budget, the government 
announced plans for a National Asset Management 
Agency, which will operate as an independent 
commercial entity under the aegis of the National 
Treasury Management Agency (NTMA): 
 
• The NAMA will buy property-related loans 
of between €80billion and €90billion from 
the covered banks at an appropriate 
discount and will pay for them by the issue 
of Irish Government bonds directly to the 
banks. 
• The income from the assets and the 
proceeds from their eventual sale will accrue 
to the NAMA and will mitigate the cost to 
the Exchequer of servicing the additional 
debt. If on wind-up the NAMA has made a 
profit, this will accrue to the State. If it 
makes a loss, the government will apply a 
levy to the banks to recoup the shortfall. 
 
 
29 May 2009  Anglo Irish Bank Capital Injection: 
Following publication of Anglo Irish Bank’s 
financial results for the six months to March 31, the 
government announced plans to provide €4billion 
of capital to Anglo Irish Bank, pending EU 
approval.  
 
 
09 December 2009 Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme (ELG) 
   2009 Introduced: 
ELG provides for an unconditional State guarantee 
for certain eligible liabilities (including deposits) up 
to five years in maturity incurred by participating 
institutions from the date they joined the ELG 
scheme to 31 December 2010. The ELG allows 
banks to issue debt maturing later than September 
2010. Eligible bonds and deposits with maturities of 
up to 5 years are guaranteed out to maturity.  
 
 
19 February 2010 Conversion of Preference Share Stake in Bank 
   of Ireland: 
The State acquires a 16 per cent shareholding in 
Bank of Ireland as the NPRF is issued with €250 
million worth of ordinary shares in lieu of the 
dividend owed to the State in respect of the 
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preference shares it received under the 
recapitalisation agreement. 
 
 
30 March 2010 Banking Statement by the Minister for Finance: 
Government announces that it is providing a 
further €8.3 billion to Anglo Irish bank via the issue 
of a promissory note and that a further €10 billion 
could be required. New capital raising targets to be 
met by December 31 2010 are set by the Financial 
Regulator for the remaining banks; Bank of Ireland 
must raise €2.7 billion, AIB €7.4 billion, EBS €875 
million and INBS €2.6 billion. The €2.6 billion for 
INBS will be injected via the issue of a promissory 
note from the State. €100 million will be given to 
EBS via the issue of special investment shares. 
 
   The Minister announces the transfer of the first 
tranche of loans to NAMA. Loans with an original 
book value of €16 billion are purchased by the 
agency for €8.5, a weighted average discount or 
haircut of 47 per cent.  
 
 
13 May   Conversion of Preference Share Stake in AIB: 
In lieu of the annual €280 million cash payment on 
the NPRF’s preference share investment, the Fund 
receives ordinary shares giving it an 18.6 per cent 
shareholding in the bank.  
 
 
31 May  Further Recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank: 
The government injects a further €2 billion into 
Anglo, part of the additional €10 billion that the 
government indicated on March 30 could be needed 
to cover the bank’s losses. 
 
 
16 June  EBS Recapitalisation: 
The government confirms that it has provided €250 
million via the issue of a promissory note to fund 
the recapitalisation of EBS. This is in addition to 
the €100 million already committed through the 
issue of special investment shares. 
 
 
23 August  NAMA Tranche 2 Transfers: 
NAMA completes the transfer of a second tranche 
of loans with a nominal value of €11.9 billion. The 
loans are purchased for €5.28 billion, a weighted 
average discount of 55.6 per cent.  
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31 August   Anglo Results and Recapitalisation: 
Following the publication of Anglo accounts for the 
first half of 2010, which show losses of €8.2 billion, 
the Minister for Finance announces that the bank 
has been recapitalised with a further €8.58 billion 
effective 30 June 2010. This brings the total cost of 
the Anglo bailout to €22.88 billion. 
 
 
8 September  Decision to Split Anglo Irish Bank: 
The government decides to split Anglo Irish Bank 
into a funding Bank and an asset recovery bank. 
The funding bank will be a government guaranteed 
deposit bank while the asset recovery bank is to 
work out Anglo’s non-NAMA loans over a period 
of time. The plan requires EU Commission 
approval. 
 
 
29 September  CIFS Guarantee Scheme Expires: 
The blanket guarantee scheme, the Credit 
Institutions Financial Support Scheme, expires. The 
ELG scheme remains in place up to 31 December 
2010. The ELG covers liabilities incurred between 
the date a financial institution joined the scheme 
and 31 December 2010. The ELG provides a 
government guarantee of debts issued with 
maturities of up to 5 years out to their maturity. 
Dated subordinated debt is not guaranteed under 
the terms of the ELG.   
 
 
30 September  Banking Statement from Government and  
   Central Bank 
Based on an assessment by the Central Bank, it is 
announced that Anglo Irish Bank will require a 
further €6.4 billion and that on the basis of “severe 
stress assumptions” it could require an additional €5 
billion. A further €2.7 billion is to be provided to 
INBS to cover its losses (see Table 18).  
 
   AIB is advised by the Central Bank that it will be 
required to raise an additional €3 billion by 21 
December 2010 on top of the €7.4 billion 
requirement announced by the Regulator in March. 
The authorities announce that the bank is 
“…unlikely to be able to conduct a traditional 
privately underwritten transaction” with the result 
that a new cash investment by the state of €3.7 
billion could be required. In addition, it is 
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announced that a substantial proportion of the 
NPRF’s preference shares in AIB will be converted 
into ordinary shares to ensure the bank meets the 
Central Bank’s capital raising target. It is also 
signalled that any residual capital shortfall will be 
met by the conversion of the remaining €1.8 billion 
preference shares. 
 
   The government announces that the support 
being provided to the banks will add 20 per cent of 
GDP to Ireland’s General Government Deficit in 
2010, pushing the overall deficit for the year to 32 
per cent. 
 
 
30 September 2010 It is announced also that the government has 
decided that where the total exposure of a debtor is 
below a €20 million threshold in Bank of Ireland 
and AIB, that debtor’s loans will not now be 
transferred to NAMA. The previous threshold was 
€5 million. There are 650 debtors with property 
related debts of between €5 and €20 million 
amounting to around €6.6 billion of the aggregate 
€80 billion volume of eligible NAMA loans. 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
All recent Commentaries have been written against a background of 
national economic crisis. With output levels apparently stabilising, with the 
falls in employment easing and with tax revenues “on target”, there might 
have been reason to assert that the crisis was at least easing. However, a 
range of severe difficulties still face the economy and in the case of at least 
one, Ireland’s capacity to borrow on international markets, difficulties have 
become more acute. As the full cost of the banking bailout has emerged, 
international markets appear to have become increasingly concerned about 
Ireland’s capacity to deal with both the banking and public finance crises. 
The emerging picture of the banks has also indicated that the presence of a 
healthy banking system in the Irish economy is further away than we might 
have thought. 
 
It is against this background that the government must soon announce 
its four-year programme of fiscal austerity. As we have shown above, it is 
possible that this programme will involve savings of up to €15 billion. 
Those figures are based on the Low Growth scenario from the Institute’s 
Recovery Scenarios paper published in July. A High Growth scenario was 
published then also and under that scenario, a less draconian set of savings 
is needed. Our view is that the European Commission is more likely to use 
a growth profile closer to our low growth scenario when assessing Ireland’s 
fiscal requirements. Consequently, we focus the discussion around the 
savings range of €15 billion and around the preferred timeframe of fiscal 
adjustment under the low growth scenario. If the high growth scenario 
from our July publication were to prevail, there is a possibility that more 
adjustment will be imposed than is actually needed. An austerity 
programme of this magnitude, confined to a four year period, will clearly 
have severe implications for economic growth. The low growth scenario 
that was presented in the Institute’s Recovery Scenarios paper envisaged an 
annual average growth rate of 3¼ per cent per annum out to 2014. Our 
calculations suggest that this growth rate would be reduced to 2¼ per cent 
as a result of this much larger adjustment package compared to the original 
package of €7.5 billion announced in the 2010 Budget.  
 
Before discussing further the implications of the austerity programme, it 
is important to note that we have grave doubts over the wisdom of the 
parameters of an austerity programme where such a high levels of savings 
will be sought in such a tight time frame. A restoration of sustainability in 
the public finances is needed, of that there is no doubt. But to us, if one 
accepts the ESRI’s Low Growth scenario as being a reasonable depiction 
of how the Irish economy might grow in the coming years, a longer time 
frame for adjustment would be preferable. The problem arises because an 
austerity package of €15 billion within four years could damage the 
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potential of the economy to grow its way out of recession. The scale and 
speed of adjustment is such that it will be exceptionally challenging to 
retain societal support. From our perspective, an agreement with the 
European Commission to reduce the deficit to 3 per cent by 2016 would 
have been preferable and would have been seen as being credible by 
international lenders, once EU agreement had been achieved.  
 
While the 2014 date strikes us as worryingly ambitious, we are mindful 
that an extension is highly unlikely and so we must operate within the 
constraints as presented. Although we have based our forecasts on a 
budgetary package of €4 billion of savings, it could well be that a higher 
amount will be sought. Whatever it is, the scale of the task is such that 
there will be a need for adjustments in current and capital spending and in 
taxation.  
 
With regard to current spending, the menu of options that was 
presented in the report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers 
and Expenditure Programmes, commonly referred to as An Bord Snip 
Nua, remains the most comprehensive overview of what might be done. 
Given the scale of what we now face, it may be necessary to explore 
whether or not the scope of that exercise is adequate to the current 
situation. It is important to recognise that the quality of the decisions we 
make in relation to the cuts will have a bearing on the rate of our long-term 
recovery.   
 
As so many of the savings outlined in that report relied on shrinking 
numbers in the public sector, we are forced to raise the question of 
whether the Croke Park deal may need to be revisited and, in particular, if 
mandatory redundancies in the public sector might have to form part of 
the adjustments. Of course, the agreement that there would be no further 
cuts in pay in the public sector is the other element of the Croke Park deal 
which, might now also have to be re-opened. 
 
On taxation, the Report of the Commission on Taxation provides an 
analysis of many relevant issues. Options such as the introduction of a 
property tax and the application of water charges are simple elements in 
any rational tax system. Even in the absence of a fiscal crisis, they should 
be introduced but the current imperative is overwhelming. The broadening 
of the tax base, especially by reducing extent of tax expenditures that grew 
in the past decade, also provides an opportunity both to improve the 
operation of the tax system and to raise necessary revenue. 
 
While we are deeply concerned about the austerity road which Ireland 
will have to pursue in the coming years, it seems that we have little room 
for manoeuvre as a result of the policies that were pursued in the early and 
middle parts of the last decade. The weak system of banking regulation and 
the growth in public spending which relied on transient sources of revenue 
contributed to bringing Ireland to this point. It is to be hoped that there 
will be beneficial dimensions to the austerity programme but the challenges 
are immense.  
RESOURCE ALLOCATION, 
FINANCING AND SUSTAINABILITY 
IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
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 The focus on acute, episodic care in the conventional health-care model fails 
to provide adequately for changing health-care needs arising from increased 
longevity and increasing prevalence of chronic disease. Integrated care 
involves coherent and co-ordinated delivery of health-care services across a 
broad range of health and social care providers. A principal aim of integrated 
health care is to improve the patient’s journey through the system by co-
ordinating care among providers and by strengthening the role of primary 
care. Effective resource allocation mechanisms, supported by appropriate 
financing arrangements, have an important role to play in delivering integrated 
health care. In addition, more efficient use of scarce health-care resources is 
required, and can be influenced by the resource allocation and financing 
mechanisms. This article summarises research undertaken by the ESRI to 
provide evidence for the Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing 
in Health Care, which reported in July 2010 (Brick et al., 2010a, b; Ruane, 
2010). The research: 
Introduction 
 
• reviewed the theoretical and international empirical literature on resource 
allocation, financing and sustainability in health care (focusing on eight 
comparator countries – Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, UK, USA); 
• evaluated current Irish systems of resource allocation and financing and 
issues associated with sustainability;  
• proposed a framework for health-care entitlements and user fees that 
would support the delivery of integrated health care in Ireland. 
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It is important to provide an overview of trends in the overall level of 
resources available for health, and the drivers of increased health-care 
expenditure. Since 2000, Irish public health expenditure has more than 
doubled in real terms to reach a level of over €15bn in 2009. It accounted for 
almost 12 per cent of national income in 2009, up from 6.3 per cent in 2000. 
Health care accounted for about one in every four euros of total public 
expenditure throughout the last decade. Concerns about sustainability are not 
unique to Ireland; total per capita expenditure on health increased by an 
average of 6.4 per cent per annum across the EU‐15, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US over the period 2000-2007. 
Sustainability 
 
Several studies have found that national income is the single most 
important driver of public health expenditure, with increases in income 
leading to proportionately equal increases in health expenditure. Other 
important factors include demographic change and an increasing burden of 
chronic disease, as well as supply‐side factors such as rising medical prices, 
technological change, increasing capital stock and labour costs, the regulatory 
regime governing behaviour in the health sector and the incentive structure 
facing health‐care providers are also important. In Ireland, while the size of 
the population increased by 17.7 per cent over the period 2000‐2009, the share 
of the population aged over 65 years actually declined slightly over the period. 
The growth in national income was much more substantial, as was the change 
in both the overall price level and the change in health prices.  
 
Particular concern over sustainability has arisen with regard to state 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals and payments to pharmacists. Approximately 
85 per cent of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Ireland relates to state 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals and payments to pharmacists under the 
General Medical Service (GMS) Scheme and community drugs schemes 
(CDS). Expenditure on the GMS Scheme alone has increased from €831m in 
2005 to €1.3bn in 2009 (195 per cent in real terms). The growth can be 
explained by a combination of increases in the price (e.g. newer, more 
expensive drugs) and volume (e.g. increase in eligibility) of drugs prescribed. 
Recent attempts to control this expenditure have focused largely on two 
particular measures, namely, attempting to secure better value for money via 
amendments to the pricing and reimbursement mechanisms on the GMS and 
CDS, and increasing the degree of cost sharing on the part of patients. 
 
 Internationally, the concept of population health need is being used to 
allocate health-care resources, in contrast to traditional methods driven by 
historic allocations to existing providers and facilities. In Ireland, resources are 
allocated largely on an historic funding basis, notwithstanding recent attempts 
to move to a more rational allocation of resources for some services (e.g. 
services for older persons). 
Resource 
Allocation 
 
Even when allocations are made on the basis of population health, the 
extent of ‘purchaser-provider split’ and methods of provider reimbursement 
can have important implications for the degree to which providers are 
financially incentivised to deliver appropriately integrated health care. One of 
the main advantages of segregating the purchasing and providing functions is 
the ability to employ financial incentives and monitoring tools to encourage 
providers to offer services more efficiently. While there is strict separation 
between the purchaser and provider in many aspects of Irish health care (e.g. 
between the HSE and GPs), other relationships are not characterised by such 
a split (e.g. the HSE owns and funds more than half of acute public hospitals).  
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Provider reimbursement can be activity-based (e.g. per number of 
patients/cases treated, treatment intensity or duration). This method could 
stimulate activity, but may be less effective at controlling costs than other 
reimbursement systems (such as global budgets or fixed salaries). The 
consensus which emerges from research is that no single payment mechanism 
can achieve all of the stated health-care objectives; rather, a mix of 
reimbursement types is required.  
 
For the remuneration of GPs, most countries use a mixture of capitation 
and fee-for-service remuneration, with salary payments less common. Many 
countries are also now experimenting with pay-for-performance elements, 
whereby GPs face financial incentives for chronic disease management, 
appropriate prescribing, data collection, etc. The Irish system is unusual in that 
methods of GP remuneration depend on patient type; predominately 
capitation for medical card patients, and fee-for-service for private patients. 
The conflicting incentives on the part of GPs that arise from this distinction 
do not facilitate the delivery of integrated health care. 
 
Casemix funding (prospective, activity-based payments) is now the 
preferred hospital reimbursement mechanism in six of the eight countries 
studied. Despite some common objectives for casemix funding, 
implementation varies considerably across countries, making it difficult to 
evaluate the system’s impacts on activity, length of stay, quality and costs. For 
treating public patients, Irish public hospitals receive budgetary allocations, 
predominantly determined by historic factors. A subset of hospitals receives a 
retrospective budgetary adjustment for treatment complexity and relative 
performance. The planned move to prospective casemix funding should 
improve the transparency between payment and activity. Of some concern are 
potential perverse (and conflicting) incentives generated by the different 
mechanisms used to reimburse Irish public hospitals and their consultants for 
public and private patients (e.g. consultants in public hospitals receive a salary 
for treating public patients but a fee-for-service for private practice). 
 
Crucial for integrated care is the alignment of financial incentives not only 
within, but also between, all sectors of the health-care system. Many 
international initiatives have sought to improve integration; however, these 
schemes generally fail to co-ordinate care across multiple conditions and lack 
formal evaluation. In Ireland, the HSE established the Integrated Services 
Directorate in 2009. While necessary, such organisational reforms are not 
sufficient for integration. Further development of primary care in particular is 
required, as well as financial incentives that are consistent across providers and 
patients. 
 
 Without resources, there is nothing to allocate. How resources are 
generated can affect the resource allocation process. In Europe, the main 
health care financing sources include public taxation, social health insurance, 
private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. In Ireland, public taxes 
account for the largest proportion of health care financing (approximately 80 
per cent) followed by out-of-pocket payments and private health insurance. 
Health systems are often grouped according to the dominant source of 
financing (e.g. tax-based systems). However, as the mix of health resource 
mechanisms is becoming more complex, it is more logical to assess the merits 
or otherwise of each individual mechanism separately. 
Financing 
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Tax and social health insurance contributions both introduce separation 
between what people pay for health care, and what they receive. This allows 
the principles for collecting resources from individuals (e.g. according to 
ability to pay) to be separate from the principles determining how those 
resources are allocated (i.e. population health need). With social health 
insurance there is a clear, observable link between available health-care 
resources and health-care entitlements; although this transparency can be 
reduced where social health insurance is supplemented by tax-based resources. 
International evidence indicates that there are ways of introducing many of the 
desired features of social health insurance in a tax-based system. In the Irish 
context, policy-makers need to address problems of poor transparency around 
public tax-based resources, in particular the complications associated with 
public subsidisation of private health care activity.  
 
Out-of-pocket payments are directly linked with the individual’s use of the 
service. These payments are outside the public resource allocation process. 
International evidence indicates that user fees discourage both necessary and 
unnecessary utilisation, and have negative implications for equity and there is 
evidence of this in Ireland. The requirement for non medical cardholders, the 
majority of the population, to pay out-of-pocket for GP care is unique to 
Ireland compared with other developed countries. An inconsistent structure 
of user fees across community, primary and acute care means that non 
medical cardholders are not always directed to the most appropriate location 
for their care. These features interrupt the delivery of integrated health care. 
Incentives facing patients and providers need to be aligned so as to ensure 
that health problems are diagnosed at the earliest opportunity, that there is 
continuity of care for people with chronic conditions and that the most 
appropriate care takes place in the most appropriate location.  
 
To support this process, a coherent framework of entitlements and user 
fees is proposed. Within the framework, a set of graduated subsidies are 
available for GP care, prescription medicines and other care for the whole 
population (people on lower incomes would receive higher levels of subsidy). 
Subsidisation of chronic conditions would also be streamlined to address 
existing inconsistencies (e.g. exclusion of certain critical conditions from the 
Long-Term Illness Scheme). The framework removes the large jumps in 
entitlement that are currently in place (e.g., where income increases above the 
GP Visit medical card eligibility threshold, the user fee for GP care increases 
from zero to the full private charge). The framework also introduces greater 
separation between payment for health care and people’s risk of ill health by 
reducing the extent to which health care is paid for at the point of use. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION 
OF BUSINESS CYCLES 
Iulia Siedschlag* 
 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Increased international economic integration over the past two decades 
has stimulated a growing academic and policy interest in the analysis of the 
international transmission of business cycles. There has been renewed 
interest recently in this research topic notably in relation to the current 
global financial and economic crisis. In an increasingly integrated world 
economy, understanding the extent to which business cycles propagate 
across countries and regions and their underlying factors is highly 
important to investors and policy makers. Furthermore, in the case of 
monetary unions, business cycle synchronisation is taken as an indication of 
a low probability of asymmetric shocks and so of a low cost of losing 
independence over monetary and exchange rate policies.   
 
Fluctuations of economic activity at regional level are likely to be more 
important than at national level because regions trade relatively more than 
countries and specialisation at regional level is higher than at regional level.  
 
A recent published paper**, analysed the patterns and determinants of 
the co-movement of economic activity between regions in the European 
Union and the Euro Area. Specifically, a panel data set of 208 regions over 
the period 1989-2002 was used to analyse the impact of regional trade 
integration, industry specialisation and exchange rate volatility on regional 
output growth synchronisation with the Euro Area.  
 
The main research findings of the paper are as follows. Over the 
analysed period, average regional output growth correlations with the Euro 
Area have remained stable. They were slightly higher for the regions in the 
Euro Area countries. Trade integration and industrial specialisation relative 
to the Euro Area average has increased in the Euro Area regions. Exchange 
rate volatility has generally decreased in the European Union’s regions but 
was higher in the regions outside the Euro Area in comparison to Euro 
*iulia.siedschlag@esri.ie 
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Area’s regions.  Deeper trade integration with the Euro Area had a strong 
direct positive effect on the synchronisation of regional output with the 
Euro Area while industrial specialisation and exchange rate volatility were 
sources of cyclical divergence. Industrial specialisation had however an 
indirect positive effect on output growth synchronisation via its positive 
effect on trade integration, while exchange rate volatility had an indirect 
additional negative effect on output growth correlations by reducing trade 
integration.  
 
On average, income differentials between regions and the Euro Area as 
well as regions’ size were negatively related to industry specialisation. 
Higher income regions traded more intensively with the Euro Area. While 
the direct positive effect of trade on regional output synchronisation with 
the Euro Area was stronger in the period before the adoption of the euro, 
the negative effect of industry specialisation was stronger since the 
adoption of the single currency. Regions in the Euro Area experienced a 
direct positive and significant effect of exchange rate volatility on output 
growth correlations before the adoption of the single currency which 
suggests that that the exchange rates acted as shock absorbers.  
 
These research results suggest a number of relevant policy implications 
for the European Economic Monetary Union. First and foremost, 
promoting trade integration with the Euro Area is likely to foster regional 
output growth synchronisation and thus lower the probability of regions 
experiencing asymmetric shocks. Second, real income convergence with the 
Euro Area average is expected to increase trade integration and at the same 
time affect the pattern of industry specialisation towards more similarity 
which in turn will increase regional output growth with the Euro Area. 
Finally, given that asymmetric shocks are still likely, policy makers should 
focus on increasing labour and product market flexibility as mechanisms 
for adjustment to region-specific shocks.  
  
 
 
 
**SIEDSCHLAG, I. and G. TONDL, “Regional Output Growth 
Synchronisation with the Euro Area”, Empirica, DOI 10.1007/s10663-010-
9130-7, published online 27 March 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL 
PARTNERSHIP ON IRELAND’S 
COMPETITIVENESS 
∗Seamus McGuinness, Elish Kelly and Philip J. O’Connell 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Social partnership has been a central facet of Irish society since 1987. In 
order to support economic growth, a principal objective of the partnership 
process has been to achieve moderate increases in wages in exchange for 
reductions in income tax to boost take home pay. To achieve this outcome, 
one of the core elements of social partnership is a centralised wage 
agreement negotiated between the Irish Government, the main employer 
bodies and Trade Unions. These wage agreements, known as the National 
Wage Agreements (NWA), have been identified in a number of studies as 
having played a pivotal role in the remarkable revival that occurred  in the 
Irish economy in the late 1980s, and the considerable growth that took 
place in the country over the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era. In particular, most of the 
research indicates that the wage restraint attained under the pay agreements 
enhanced the country’s competitiveness, through lower labour costs, and 
this consequently led to both significant employment and economic 
growth. Real unit labour costs in Ireland have fallen in most years since the 
social partnership process began in 1987 Over the 1987-2002 period, unit 
labour costs fell by around 25 per cent in Ireland compared to, 
approximately, 10 per cent across the EU. Thus, this would seem to 
suggest that the wage increases under social partnership have been modest 
enough to boost Ireland’s international competitiveness.  
 
Nevertheless, most of the evidence presented is of a highly descriptive 
nature and, to date, the relationship between the NWA and 
competitiveness has never been explicitly tested. Our paper** analyses data 
from 6,500 private sector firms, drawn from the CSO’s 2003 National 
Employment Survey (NES), to analyse the impact of institutional wage 
bargaining arrangements on levels of average labour costs and within firm 
wage dispersion in private sector corporations in Ireland.   
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Over 5 out of 6 firms reported that the dominant mode of bargaining 
over wages in their firm was at either individual level, firm level, business-
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level or national wage agreement level. Individual-level contracts represent the 
situation where the worker negotiates directly with management. Business-
level and industry-level agreements represent bargaining by trade-unions on 
behalf of all workers within the firm or industry respectively. The national 
wage agreement describes the pay determination that arises directly as a result 
of the social partnership process. Clearly, business, industry and national-
level represent the various types of collective wage bargaining. Within the 
data, individual-level bargaining was found to be the dominant pay strategy 
within 43 per cent of firms in Ireland in 2003. The NWA was the next 
most common form of bargaining, adopted by 28 per cent of companies, 
while business-level and industry-level agreements were each implemented 
in 7 per cent of firms respectively1. 
 
The analysis conducted revealed that relative to the NWA, average 
labour costs were higher in firms implementing individual and business-
level bargaining. However, important differences emerged for indigenous 
firms and multinational companies (MNC’s). In particular, the research 
indicated that MNCs implementing the NWA enjoy a labour cost 
advantage that exceeds that of other multinationals and indigenous firms 
holding other characteristics constant. This result suggests that there have 
been large gains, in terms of competitiveness, to MNCs that locate in 
Ireland. However, what are the mechanisms through which social 
partnership leads to a competitive advantage to MNCs? The most obvious 
possibility is that MNCs prefer to locate in countries with centralised 
bargaining, due to the gain in competitiveness associated with wage setting 
aimed at securing the interests of domestic firms. Specifically, within a 
social partnership system, trade unions will choose to limit wage demands 
in order to preserve employment levels in less competitive domestic firms. 
Consequently, MNCs adopting the NWA, which is designed to protect 
employment in indigenous companies with lower productivity levels, are 
able to set wages at levels well below what would normally be the case than 
if bargaining was undertaken by trade unions at the business-level or where 
individuals negotiated directly with their employer.   
 
 
 
** MCGUINNESS, S., E. KELLY and P.J. O’CONNELL (2010). “The 
Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm-level Competitiveness and 
Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland”, Industrial Relations: A Journal of 
Economy and Society, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 593-615. 
 
1 In approximately 15 per cent of firms no single type of agreement was dominant. 
 COMMUTING BEHAVIOUR AND 
CAR OWNERSHIP IN IRELAND 
Anne Nolan∗ 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Rapid economic, demographic and social change in Ireland over the past 
fifteen years, with associated increases in car dependence and congestion, 
has focused policy on encouraging more sustainable forms of travel. Data 
for journeys to work, school and college confirm the shift towards the 
private car. The proportions driving to work increased from 46 per cent in 
1996 to 57 per cent in 2006, while the proportion of primary school 
students travelling as car passengers increased from 36 per cent in 1996 to 
55 per cent in 2006, overtaking the proportions walking (24 per cent), 
which had traditionally been the primary means of transport to school for 
this age-group. In this context, knowledge of current travel patterns and 
their determinants is crucial. In a series of recent papers, ESRI researchers 
use micro-data from a variety of sources to examine various aspects of 
commuting behaviour and car ownership in Ireland.  
Introduction 
 
 Analyses of travel behaviour by individuals typically focus on the journey 
to work, due to the availability of data and the potential for behavioural 
change resulting from the routine and repetitive nature of the journey. The 
first† of two papers on commuting behaviour analyses the demographic, 
socio-economic and supply-side determinants of the choice of mode of 
transport to work in the Greater Dublin Area. Using detailed micro-data on 
the full population of working individuals from the 2006 Census of 
Population, the results indicate that household composition (particularly 
the presence of young children), public transport availability, car 
availability, journey time and work location are particularly important in 
explaining variation in mode choice across the working population.  
Commuting 
Behaviour 
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While proximity to a QBC (quality bus corridor) is significant in 
explaining the increased probability of travelling to work by public 
transport, it is insignificant in explaining cycle use, which suggests that 
QBCs should not be considered a substitute for dedicated cycle lanes. A 
number of characteristics have divergent effects on bus and train use; while 
those with higher levels of education are significantly less likely to travel by 
bus to work, they are significantly more likely to travel by train. This 
suggests that the bus may suffer from an image problem and that 
continued investment in measures such as QBCs and express bus services 
for commuters may be needed to improve the attractiveness of the bus as a 
mode of transport to work.  
 
In the second paper††, the authors extend the analysis to account for the 
possible endogeneity of the car ownership decision by analysing the joint 
decision of car ownership and mode of transport to work.  Using the same 
micro-data from the 2006 Census of Population, they also extend the 
analysis to the entire country, and estimate separate models for Dublin city 
and county, the commuter counties of the Greater Dublin Area, other 
urban areas and rural areas. The analysis also incorporates information on 
travel costs for the first time.  
 
As with the earlier analysis, household composition (particularly the 
presence of young children), public transport availability and journey time 
are found to be particularly important in explaining variation the car 
ownership-mode choice decision. The results for journey time and cost are 
highly significant, indicating that a change in the relative time or monetary 
costs of public transport relative to driving a car are likely to make these 
more sustainable modes more atractive to commuters. The results suggest 
that travel time exerts a stronger influence on individual travel behaviour. 
In this context, measures which seek to make more sustainable modes of 
transport more comparable with the private car in terms of journey times 
(e.g., dedicated cycle and bus lanes, more frequent public transport services, 
etc.) may be just as important as monetary incentives in inducing 
individuals to travel by more sustainable forms of transport. 
 
 As the preferred mode for the majority of individuals’ journey to work, it 
is worth examining the car ownership decision in greater detail. Using 
longitudinal data from the Living in Ireland Survey over the period 1995-
2001, the third paper††† examines the determinants of household car 
ownership. This was a period of rapid economic and social change in 
Ireland, with the proportion of households with one or more cars growing 
from 75 per cent to 81 per cent over the period.  
Car 
Ownership 
 
There is a high degree of persistence in household car ownership 
decisions, with previous levels of car ownership highly significant in 
explaining current ownership. The income effects suggest that permanent 
income (the so-callled ‘long-run’ effect) exerts a stronger and more 
significant effect on household car ownership that current income (the 
‘short-run’ effect). In addition, income elasticities are found to differ by 
previous car ownership status, with income elasticities much higher for 
those with no car in the initial period. Other household characteristics such 
as the presence of young children and the employment status, marital status 
and education level of the household reference person are also important 
influences on household car ownership. 
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 While the data upon which these analyses were based refer to the period 
before the sharp downturn in the Irish economy, the results have a number 
of implications for policy. In terms of encouraging more sustainable modes 
of transport for the journey to work, policies which result in favourable 
journey times for walking, cycling and public transport could be particularly 
effective. The persistence of household car ownership over time, as well as 
the importance of household characterstics such as the presence of young 
children, creates challenges for policymakers in trying to change behaviour. 
Commuting and car ownership are just two of the many transport-related 
decisions that have important economic and environmental implications 
for Ireland; further research is ongoing at the ESRI on other aspects of 
transport behaviour such as mode choice for other journey purposes (e.g., 
travel to school), as well as the impact of recent tax changes on car 
ownership decisions. 
Summary 
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 PROVIDING QUALITY PHARMACY 
SERVICES: GOOD INTENTIONS 
ARE NOT ENOUGH  
Paul K Gorecki∗ 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin 
 
 
 Elected representatives, like consumers, want reliable good quality 
medical services. Pharmacy services are no exception. Providing sound 
advice on which drug to take for a minor ailment, or the common side 
effects of a drug or keeping careful track of a consumer’s drug regimen, 
promote good health outcomes.   
 
Government in 1996 introduced two inter-related policies designed to raise 
the quality of pharmacy services in Ireland.    
  
• First, the Health (Community Pharmacy Contract Agreement) 
Regulations, 1996. The 1996 Pharmacy Regulations confined the 
opening of new pharmacies to instances where there was a ‘definite 
public health need.’ Minimum distances were specified between 
pharmacies. New pharmacies could not threaten the viability of an 
existing pharmacy.1  
• Second, the 1996 Community Pharmacy Contract, between an 
individual pharmacy and a Health Board, specified that pharmacists 
were to provide certain services drawing on their professional 
knowledge and expertise. These included checking the drug 
regimen of a consumer, including the examination of the rational 
and cost effective use of medicines.    
Government funded community drug schemes account for the vast 
majority of drugs dispensed. 
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 These two policies appear, however, to have had little effect on the quality 
of pharmacy services, while having some undesirable side effects: 
 
• The 1996 Pharmacy Regulations led to a drastic decline in the 
opening of new pharmacies, despite a large increase in demand, 
with the result that the value of pharmacies was inflated 
considerably – by between 40 per cent and 60 per cent. There is 
little evidence that these restrictions on entry led to any 
improvement in service quality – casting doubt on the purported 
rationale for the policy. If pharmacists, as private parties, has agreed 
collectively to these regulations they would almost certainly have 
been guilty of a breach of Section 4(1) of the Competition Act, 
which prohibits anti-competitive agreements. 
• The 1996 Community Pharmacy Contract provisions relating to 
improved pharmacy services for consumers are aspirational. The 
provisions are largely unenforceable; do not recognise the 
conflicting motivations of a pharmacist and result in no measurable 
output.   
Five lessons are presented so as to inform future community pharmacy 
contracts so as to better realise any desired improvements in service quality. 
 
Lesson #1: Avoid Regulatory Capture – Government intervention 
should promote consumer welfare and be consistent with the better 
regulation agenda, rather than, as appears to be the case here, primarily 
benefiting the producer – incumbent pharmacies.   
 
Lesson #2: A Valid Rationale? – Regulatory intervention requires a valid 
rationale such as market power, externalities or information asymmetries 
that is consistent with the facts.  The rationale for restricting the opening 
new pharmacies was “over competition.”  The evidence suggested no such 
state of affairs; if anything the pharmacy market had many of the hall 
marks of a protected less than competitive market that required more 
competition and more not less entry.   
 
Lesson #3: Contracts Should be S.M.A.R.T. – A contract between a 
purchaser, such as the health board, and provider, such as a pharmacy, 
should be well specified.  They should be SMART – Specific; Measurable; 
Attainable; Realistic; and Timely – rather than aspirational. 
 
Lesson #4: Incentives Count, So Don’t Ignore Them – Regulatory 
regimes or contracts for services should ensure that these are incentive 
compatible with the motivation of the provider. If pharmacists are 
compensated on the basis of a mark-up on the cost of a drug then they will 
have an incentive to dispense a high priced brand. Expecting the 
pharmacist to spend time persuading the physician to prescribe a lower 
priced brand, since the pharmacist is not able to dispense a lower priced 
brand without permission, is thus doubly unlikely – a loss in income from 
dispensing a lower priced brand and the time taken to persuade the 
prescriber.   
 
Lesson #5: Markets Do Work: Working with Rather than Against the 
Market – New entrants typically supply new ideas, new ways of doing 
things, with the result that productivity and innovation increase.  
78 
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Competitive markets are able to provide improved services in terms of 
prices and other non-price aspects that are valued by consumers, such as 
opening hours, home delivery and so on.   
 
It could, of course, be argued that these lessons are of historical interest 
only. In fact, they are still highly relevant, as evidenced by the statement as 
of 2009 from the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland, the pharmacists’ 
regulatory body: “[A] model based on the ‘free market’ should be 
discouraged and instead the normative need of the patients and population 
should be the driving forces behind a new generation of pharmacy services. 
Restrictions on new pharmacy openings should be considered and a 
methodology that optimises fair access for patients and ensures pharmacies 
are located where need is identified, should be developed.”  
 
 
 
GORECKI, P. K., 2010. “Do you believe in magic? Improving the quality 
of pharmacy services through restricting entry and aspirational contracts, 
the Irish experience”, European Journal of Health Economics, published online 
9 July 2010.   
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